THE CHARACTER AND FUNCTIONING OF MUNICIPAL CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

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REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON CIVIL SERVICE
GOVERNMENTAL RESEARCH CONFERENCE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA

Submitted at the Annual Meeting, at Cleveland
June 1-3, 1922

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June 2, 1922.

MR. FREDERICK P. GRUENBERG, *Chairman,*
The Governmental Research Conference
of the United States and Canada.

DEAR SIR:

The Committee on Civil Service herewith presents its report on the character and functioning of municipal civil service commissions in the United States.

In presenting this report, permit us to recount briefly some of the more important facts with regard to the committee's work. It will be recalled that the Governmental Research Conference, at its eighth meeting, held in Indianapolis in November, 1920, authorized the appointment of a number of committees on special phases of governmental activity with which the members of the Conference are concerned. In pursuance of this action, on March 16, 1921, Mr. James W. Routh, then chairman of the Conference, announced a number of committees, among them one on civil service. As members of this committee, he designated the individuals who now constitute its personnel.

Only a brief preliminary report was made by this committee at the ninth meeting of the Conference, held at Philadelphia in June, 1921. In this report it was indicated that the committee had decided to concentrate its attention on the civil service commission itself. It was the opinion of the committee at that time, as it is now, that "while there are many specific problems demanding attention in the civil service field, any effort to solve them will depend for success upon the body charged with the administration of the employment function of government."

Since the ninth meeting of the Conference, the committee has continued its labors along the lines originally planned. Two different questionnaires were formulated and sent to various organizations, officials, and individuals throughout the country. One of these questionnaires was addressed mainly to bureaus of governmental research, but was forwarded also to a number of civil service officials and to individuals who were conversant with civil service conditions in their localities. The other questionnaire was sent to all of the civil service commissions throughout the country. Both questionnaires were designed to bring out facts that would throw light on the functioning of the commissions. With the

information thus obtained together with data from other sources as a guide, the committee proceeded to formulate its conclusions in the report herewith presented.

Because of the distances which separated the members of the committee geographically, it was necessary to carry on most of our exchange of views by correspondence. The final consideration of the salient features of the report, however, was given in a series of conferences in Cleveland at which all the members were present.

The committee wishes to make grateful acknowledgment of the generous and helpful coöperation of those members of the Conference and of the civil service officials and others who supplied the committee with information in regard to conditions in their local jurisdictions. It is under special obligations to Mr. G. H. Stuart Bunning, Vice Chairman of the National Whitley Council of England, for his comments on the chapter dealing with civil service control abroad, and to Dr. Joseph H. Willits, Professor of Industry, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, for examining the chapter on employment administration in private industry. It wishes also to record its appreciation of the valuable assistance of Mr. J. Howard Branson in the preparation of the questionnaires and the tabulation of the replies, and of Miss Helen C. Toerring in collecting information with regard to employes' participation in management in private industry and in arranging the tabular material for presentation in this report.

Respectfully submitted,

A. H. Place,
W. E. Mosher,
William C. Beyer,
Chairman.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

The Growing Importance of Our Public Service

Its Numerical Growth in the Past

Our public service is becoming ever more important. During the last century and a quarter it has not only increased enormously in absolute size, but relatively it has grown about ten times as rapidly as the population of the country. At the present time there are in the civilian public service of our federal, state, and local governments approximately 2,300,000 persons, exclusive of teachers in the public schools. This means that one in every group of 45 inhabitants of the United States is now a civilian government worker. If we should include teachers in the public schools, the ratio of public servants to total population would be larger still. The annual payroll of this army of government employes, exclusive of teachers, is probably in the neighborhood of $2,500,000,000, or about $120 for every family in the land.

Prospects of Further Growth in the Future

It seems altogether likely that in the future the public service will continue to grow and to absorb a larger and larger proportion of the workers of the country. The enormous increase in the number of government employes in the past has been due largely to the marked expansion of governmental functions, and so long as this expansion continues the public service is bound to grow in size. Indications are that it will continue. Although we hear a great deal in these days about retrenchment and economy, there is seemingly little disposition on the part of citizens generally to go without some of the services now rendered to them by publicly supported agencies. On the contrary, the people are, if anything, more insistent than ever on better service. They want better schools, larger libraries, more commodious public buildings, cleaner streets, safer factories, improved mail service, more efficient police and fire protection, finer parks, greater security from disease and pestilence, more adequate care of the unfortunates of society. Strongly as they may desire lower taxes, this constant demand for more and better service inevitably results in greater public expenditures and in a larger number of persons in government employ.

The Expansion of Governmental Functions

Not only is it likely that the existing functions of government will be conducted on a larger scale than in the past, but entirely new functions will be added from time to time. We are rapidly drifting toward public ownership and operation of public utilities. Already we have gone a long way toward this goal. Most of the larger cities now own and operate their water works, and the smaller cities are rapidly following suit. The growth in municipal electric light plants during the last forty years has been nothing short of phenomenal. Even street car lines are now owned and operated by a number of American municipalities. In North Dakota we are witnessing the interesting experiment of a state engaging in the banking business, providing hail insurance for farmers, and operating mills and elevators. The federal government, through its parcels post service and its postal savings banks, has entered into a field formerly reserved exclusively for private business. Meanwhile powerful groups in the community are urging the nationalization of the railroads, the telegraph and telephone systems, the express companies, the steamship lines, the coal mines, and the meat packing industry. How fast we shall tend in this direction we do not know. It seems clear, however, that our various governments will continue to undertake new activities, as well as expand those in which they are already engaged. As a consequence more and more persons will be added to the already imposing force of government workers.

More Attention to Public Employment Needed

In view of this situation it becomes nothing less than imperative that we give more careful consideration to the conditions and methods of employment in the public service. As taxpayers we are concerned because of the ever swelling item in our annual expenditures that goes for defraying the cost of the public payroll; and as consumers we are concerned because the goods and services that we need in our daily lives are furnished to us to an ever increasing extent by public agencies or subject to their supervision. It is therefore of prime importance to us that our public service be efficient, and that the conditions of employment therein be made equitable.

The Pre-Spoils Era

In the early days of the history of this country very little systematic attention was given to the employment problems in government service. There was, in fact, no great need for such attention. The activities of government were few, and the number of persons engaged in them was not large. At that time the spoils system had not yet fastened its grip upon our body politic. Appointments, promotions, and removals were made with a free hand, but usually with due regard to the fitness of the person for the job and his efficiency in the service. These conditions prevailed until the beginning of the Jackson administration.

The Spoils System

From the inauguration of Andrew Jackson as president in 1829 to the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, we may be said to have had the unrestricted sway of the spoils system. Men were appointed, promoted, and removed, not on the basis of fitness for the work to be performed, but on account of their political affiliations and activities. The slogan of that period was "To the victors belong the spoils." Public offices were regarded as the spoils of war which it was legitimate to distribute among the faithful followers of the victorious political party. The result was that wholesale removals followed every change in political control. This condition, it can easily be understood, made neither for efficiency in the service nor for fairness of treatment of government workers.

Civil Service Reform

The third epoch begins with the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883 and continues practically to the present time. This piece of legislation was designed to place appointments, promotions, and removals on a merit basis by means of a system of competitive examinations. Quite naturally, however, the proponents of this reform were more intent, in those days, upon preventing the abuses that had obtained under the spoils system than they were upon establishing a positive program of employment administration.

Even the spoils system, however, was not dealt an immediate death blow. Only by slow stages has the movement for civil service reform been able to curb the worst abuses of this vicious practice in a small portion of the public service of the country. After

almost forty years of struggle only a limited number of our various separate governments have secured civil service laws. Fortunately the larger part of our federal service is now subject to the provisions of the Act of 1883. All of our cities having a population of 500,000 and over now operate under similar legal provisions, but only ten of our states have civil service laws governing their executive departments; and all except 240 of our smaller cities (other than those of Massachusetts and New Jersey) are still outside the pale of the merit system.

Not only does the spoils system still hold sway in most of our local and state governments and to a limited extent under the federal government, but its abuses persist also to a varying degree in those branches of the public service where the merit system is supposed to be in force. Large classes of positions in the classified service have been exempted from competitive examination, either by legislative action, or by decree of civil service commissions. Lax administration of our civil service laws, too, has permitted some of the old-time evils to continue. To a large extent civil service commissions themselves have been made footballs of politics. In many cases their appropriations have been kept so low that even the process of initial selection could not be carried out in an adequate manner. Thus we have at the present time neither the one system nor the other, but a mixture of the two, each still struggling for supremacy.

The Influence of Developments in Private Industry

The Employment Management Movement

Within the last decade a new impulse has been given to public employment administration by developments in the field of private industry. One of these developments is the employment management movement. Springing originally out of a desire on the part of private employers to cut down the labor turnover and thus lessen the enormous cost of hiring and firing, this movement has broadened in purpose and grown in scope until it has come to include a broad program of activities. In one place or another employment departments concern themselves with the initial selection of employes; with their training after they enter the service; with their working conditions, such as hours of work, vacations, and sick leaves; with their compensation; with their health and physical environment; with their opportunity for advancement; with their transfer from one department to another in order to fit

each worker into his proper niche and to prevent the absurdity of discharging employes from one department while new workers are being hired in another department; with their grievances in regard to working conditions, wages, and unfair treatment by supervisory officials or others; with their recreational activities; with policies and plans affecting their retirement and pensioning; and with the various problems of joint control. Among other activities of employment departments may be mentioned also the keeping of personnel records, computing the cost of labor turnover by departments, and conducting personnel experiments and investigations such as fatigue studies. While it is true that in some of these phases of employment administration, particularly in the selection of employes, the methods of the employment manager are less highly developed and refined than those of our civil service commissions, yet the mere fact that private employers too are finding it worth while to deal systematically with the personnel problems confronting them has given a decided impetus to the work being done in the public service. The negative function of keeping the spoilsmen out is no longer regarded by the more progressive civil service administrators as the primary duty of our commissions, and the positive function of promoting morale and efficiency is rapidly coming to be recognized as at least equally, if not more, important than the negative one.

Workers' Participation in Management

The other development is that of workers' participation in management. Partly, perhaps, to resist the tide of unionization of industrial workers, but partly also to afford to employes some opportunity of self-expression and of contributing their knowledge and their point of view to the formulation of shop policies and the adjustment of working conditions, hundreds of private employers in all sections of the country and in all the more important industries have of late years induced their workers to organize in individual establishments and through representatives elected by them to participate in important phases of internal administration. In some plants, it is true, little real authority has been conferred upon the committees and councils through which the workers participate in administration; but in others the authority thus conferred extends to important problems such as wage adjustment and adjustment of grievances; general working conditions, such as hours of work, discipline, and dismissal of workers; and safety regulations. The decisions reached by the workers'

councils are usually merely advisory, but in some cases they are final and binding. This movement in private industry is often spoken of as "industrial democracy," and, while it still falls far short of being anything like complete democracy in industry, it is at least a step in that direction. For our public service its great significance lies in the recognition this movement has given to the importance of making a place for the worker himself in the counsels of the management.

A Condition of Further Progress in Public Personnel Administration

To what extent a positive employment program will be carried out in the public service will depend very largely upon our civil service commissions. Most of them now have many of the legal powers necessary for the new role, but they are not exercising these powers to the full nor in a manner best designed to promote morale and efficiency. Some features of our typical civil service acts have never had any place of consequence in practical policy. What is needed, therefore, is not so much a change in our laws as a change in their administration.

This brings us to the question whether our civil service commissions, as they are now constituted, may be expected to measure up to the new tasks that will devolve upon them with the change of emphasis from the prevention of spoils to the promotion of morale and efficiency. Many observers are of the opinion that these administrative agencies, not having shown themselves equal to the tasks which they were expected to perform in the past, will be entirely unequal to the more exacting duties that modern employment needs will impose on them in the future. Are these observers correct in their opinions? If they are, we need to consider seriously the problem of reconstituting our commissions in such a manner that their weaknesses may be overcome.

Standards for Appraising Civil Service Commissions

In any effort to appraise our civil service commissions we need to be guided by certain reasonable standards upon which the appraisers can agree. These standards may well be divided into two groups: one group consisting of those which may fairly be applied to the conduct of civil service commissions in the past; and the other group including the additional standards to which these commissions ought to conform in the future but which should be

applied with considerable leniency in appraising their past performance.

1. The first group, in the opinion of the committee, should include the following standards:

a. *That civil service commissions should be non-political in character.*

This would seem an obvious requirement. If political considerations are to be excluded from appointments, promotions and dismissals in the public service, the commission itself must do its work without political bias.

b. *That civil service commissions should faithfully enforce merit principles.*

The very essence of proper civil service administration consists of the enforcement of merit principles. To the extent that commissions fail in this, they fall short of fulfilling their most important mission.

c. *That civil service commissions should maintain continuity of employment policy.*

Frequent change or reversal of policy, occasioned by changes in the personnel of the commission or otherwise, is nearly always fatal to the orderly building up of an employment program. In the long run, even mediocre methods consistently adhered to will produce better results than superior methods half-heartedly and spasmodically applied.

2. There is a second group of standards to which civil service commissions have not always been expected to conform in the past but to which they will have to conform more and more in the future. The standards in this group are as follows:

a. *That civil service commissions should be under professional guidance.*

The public service is becoming so complex and its requirements so varied and technical that merit principles can no longer be applied by rule-of-thumb methods. From this it follows that the agency charged with the administration of these principles must be under professional guidance.

b. *That civil service commissions should perform adequately all the employment functions of government.*

In this statement the emphasis is to be placed on the words "adequately" and "all." Civil service commissions

ought to perform not only those functions that are expressly assigned to them in existing laws but also the other functions that properly belong to the personnel agency of government. Unless we are disposed to neglect some of these functions, we must either centralize them in a single administrative agency, the civil service commission; or we must permit each department to have its own personnel agent, thus decentralizing responsibility; or we must create a second central agency to perform the functions neglected by the civil service commission.

c. *That civil service commissions should make possible democratic administration of the employment affairs of government.*

It is coming more and more to be recognized that employes should have a voice in determining their conditions of employment. As we have already pointed out, this is true particularly in private industry where the movement of workers' representation in management has made remarkable strides during the last five years. In promoting morale and efficiency, few factors are so important as a reasonable degree of participation by employes in the administration of employment affairs.

The Purpose and Scope of Report

With these standards in mind, the committee has endeavored to examine the character and functioning of municipal civil service commissions in the United States, to draw lessons from the experience of private concerns and of other countries in employment administration, and to suggest ways of improving our civil service administration, with particular reference to the make-up of the commissions themselves.

In order to focus attention on the specific problem with which this report is concerned—the constitution of the commission—the committee has purposely omitted discussion of other factors that affect the administration of the employment function of government. It is true that some consideration has been given to financial needs, a broadening of the functions of the commission also has been suggested; but important as these subjects are they have been subordinated to the central theme of the report. Other matters, such as the relation of state commissions to local civil service ad-

ministration; the effect of veterans' preference legislation; the meaning for the merit system of the short ballot movement, of proportional representation, and of the city-manager plan of government—these and similar aspects of the general problem of civil service reform have been left entirely out of account. While their significance is fully recognized by the committee, it was thought inadvisable to introduce them into the discussion and thus detract attention from the main point at issue.

The Sources of Information Used

In the judgment of the committee it was considered important that helpful criticism of the civil service commission should be based so far as possible on a quantitative survey of present conditions. To that end a questionnaire was formulated covering the character of the commission and its activities along the more important lines. This questionnaire was forwarded to bureaus of governmental research and other civic agencies, to individuals who were in a position to judge fairly of the civil service in their own localities, and to civil service commissions themselves. All told, the committee received responses to its questionnaire from thirty-one different jurisdictions. They are as follows:

Akron, Ohio
Albany, N. Y.
Baltimore, Md.
Buffalo, N. Y.
Cincinnati, Ohio
Cleveland, Ohio
Columbus, Ohio
Dayton, Ohio
Denver, Colo.
Detroit, Mich.
Elmira, N. Y.
Elyria, Ohio
Houston, Texas
Illinois
Kansas City, Kan.
Kansas City, Mo.
Los Angeles, Calif.
Maryland
Massachusetts
Milwaukee, Wis.
Minneapolis, Minn.
New Haven, Conn.
New York City
Ohio
Philadelphia, Pa.
Rochester, N. Y.
St. Paul, Minn.
San Francisco, Calif.
Syracuse, N. Y.
Toledo, Ohio
United States Civil Service Commission

From seventeen of these jurisdictions the information was supplied by bureaus of governmental research and other civic agencies; from four it was supplied by individuals; and from ten by officials of the civil service commissions themselves, usually the secretaries.

For the purpose of dealing with a more or less homogeneous

group of jurisdictions, the federal government, the four state governments, and the cities of Elmira and Elyria have been largely left out of account in the following discussion, though occasional reference is made to them. This leaves a balance of twenty-four cities. These cities each have a population of 100,000 and more inhabitants. They are scattered over thirteen different states from Massachusetts to California and from Wisconsin to Texas. Apart from Illinois, all of the important states where local civil service control has made a place for itself are represented.

A second questionnaire was then formulated and was sent directly to the civil service commissions of all jurisdictions of which the committee had any record. It differed from the first in that more emphasis was laid on recorded data and details of administration. Naturally, no reference was made as to the success or lack of it in the operations of the commission. To this questionnaire replies were received from the following twenty-seven commissions:

Buffalo, N. Y.
California
Conneaut, Ohio
Dayton, Ohio
Detroit, Mich.
Freemont, Ohio
Illinois
Ithaca, N. Y.
Little Falls, N. Y.
Los Angeles (city), Calif.
Los Angeles County, Calif.
Maryland
Massachusetts
Milwaukee, Wis.
New Jersey
New York City
New York State
Ogdensburg, N. Y.
Philadelphia, Pa.
Portland, Ore.
St. Paul, Minn.
San Diego, Calif.
San Jose, Calif.
Seattle, Wash.
Tacoma, Wash.
Wisconsin
Yonkers, N. Y.

In addition to the information in these questionnaires (which is summarized in Appendices II and III), the committee consulted official reports and other literature on the subject of employment administration and drew upon the first hand experience and observation of individual members of the committee in various civil service jurisdictions.

Findings and Recommendations

Summary of the Committee's Findings

The committee's findings may be summarized briefly, as follows:

1. In the main, our civil service commissions have been under political domination rather than under professional guidance, the individual members of commissions usually being appointed more largely on account of political considerations than because of their understanding of employment problems.

2. Although some of our commissions have shown commendable courage and devotion in carrying out the spirit of our civil service laws, yet generally speaking we have not secured a faithful enforcement of merit principles.

3. Owing to the high rate of turn-over in the membership of our civil service commissions and the subservience of our commissions to the will of the chief executive, we have not had that continuity of employment policy which is so important to effective administration of the civil service.

4. Most commissions have performed only a small portion of the functions now coming to be recognized as belonging to the personnel agency of government.

5. Our civil service commissions as now constituted represent only the management and no effort has been made to give adequate participation to the workers in determining conditions of employment.

6. In order to correct these shortcomings in the administration of civil service, it is essential first of all to reconstitute our commissions along different lines.

Recommendations of the Committee

The committee recommends:

1. The expansion of the civil service commission to a personnel agency composed as follows:

A civil service commissioner chosen by competitive test, who is to be chairman and executive officer, to serve during good behavior and efficient service at a salary approximately equal to that of other department heads with comparable responsibilities; and two associate commissioners—one appointed by the executive head of the municipality from his administrative staff and one elected by the employes in the classified service. The two associates are to share equally with the commissioner the responsibilities of the legislative and judicial functions, but to act in an advisory capacity only in administrative matters and to serve without additional compensation.

2. The appropriation of sufficient funds to carry on all of the functions contemplated for the personnel agency.

CHAPTER II

HOW OUR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS ARE CONSTITUTED

Source of Authority

Of the twenty-four cities considered in this phase of our investigation all have legislative authority or mandate to organize a civil service commission and to administer its functions according to the state law or home rule charter provisions or both. In no case does the civil service commission owe its existence to local legislative authority.

In the matter of administration, the commissions of the nine cities in New York and Ohio, like all the other local commissions in those states, are subject to supervision and disciplinary control on the part of the state civil service commission.[1] As this control is at present exercised, however, it results rather in the prevention of irregularities than in the development of different or markedly higher standards.

The commissions in the other cities are entirely independent of other than local control.

Methods of Selection

The most customary method of selection is appointment by the mayor or chief administrative authority, such, for instance, as the commission or council in commission or city-manager governed cities. This method holds in seventeen cities where the commission is appointed by the mayor,[2] in three (Buffalo, Dayton, and Kansas City, Kan.) where it is appointed by the city commission. There are three exceptional cases, Philadelphia, Denver, and St. Paul. In the first two cities, the council appoints the mem-

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[1] In Massachusetts and New Jersey the state commissions exercise direct control over civil service matters in the local governments, there being no local commissions as in New York and Ohio.

[2] The mayor's appointments must meet with the approval of the council in Milwaukee. According to the reports available in the National Municipal League and the National Institute of Public Administration, slightly over one-tenth of the cities with a city-manager form of government have a civil service commission. These cities (28 in number) are located in 10 different states.

bers of the commission, and in the third the comptroller is *ex officio* the civil service commissioner.[3]

It thus appears that the typical civil service commission consists of members who are selected and appointed by the chief executive of the city.

Restrictions on Appointing Power

Generally speaking, the mayor has a free hand in the matter of appointments except for two or three rather frequent restrictions: (1) In all but seven cities there is a residence requirement; (2) slightly over two-thirds of the cities, *i. e.*, fourteen of the twenty supplying the information, forbid the holding of other public office; (3) thirteen of twenty-two restrict freedom of appointment on the basis of political connections, requiring that all members of the commission shall not belong to the same political party. This usually means that one of three commissioners is a member of the minority political party.

In passing it might be noted that this provision tends to emphasize the partisan character of a body whose chief function is the recognition of merit irrespective of partisan considerations. The provision has its origin in the federal Act of 1883 which may be considered the forerunner and model of modern civil service laws. In the opening section of this act it prescribes that not more than two commissioners (of a total of three) "shall be adherents of the same party."

It is striking that none of the returns make any reference to requirements of a professional nature nor as to training and previous experience. The statute applying to Minneapolis does, it is true, go so far as to require that only such persons as "favor merit and efficiency in the public service" shall be appointed to the civil service commission, and the statutes applying to Denver, San Francisco, and Kansas City, Mo., contain similar requirements. These provisions would not seem to be entirely inappropriate in view of the fact that one of our largest cities is reported to have a commissioner at present who not alone disapproves of the civil service law, but is ready to make possible its evasion when opportunity offers.

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[3] In Pueblo, Colorado, the members of the civil service commission are elected by the people.

Size, Tenure, and Compensation

With the exception of Detroit, Milwaukee, Los Angeles, and St. Paul, all of the municipal commissions consist of three members. Detroit has four commissioners, in St. Paul the comptroller acts as sole commissioner, and the other two cities have five.[4]

The most common tenure of office is for six years (nine of twenty-two commissions); five of the cities call for a four-year period; three for a three-year and three for a two-year period. Only one law stipulates tenure for five years, and in one city (Rochester) the length of service is at the pleasure of the mayor.

In order to insure continuity of policy, on the one hand, and to prevent the "packing" of the commission with the adherents of the mayor in office, on the other, the custom of providing overlapping terms is now practically standard practice. The laws of sixteen of twenty-two cities contain this provision. Where the tenure is for six years, for example, one commissioner is to be appointed every two years for a period of six years. In this way the typical commission consisting of three members could not be completely made over to suit the interests of a partisan mayor until the fifth year of office holding, although he could control that body as early as the third year. On account of this and other provisions covering the period of appointment, the terms of all the civil service commissioners and that of the mayor do not coincide in the majority of cities. This is true in sixteen of twenty-three cities reporting. These safeguards, however, have not sufficed to keep the personnel of the commission intact during changes of administration, as will be shown in the following chapter.

The relative insecurity of tenure of the commissioners is due to the legal provision making removal possible. Twenty of twenty-three cities permit removal by the appointing authority. In only two (Houston and Los Angeles) is the consent of the council required. In eight it is provided that removal shall take place only for cause. The actual average tenure of office in these cities, however, does not warrant the conclusion that this restriction has proved to be a very effective curb on the removing power of the executive.

The compensation of the commissioners varies from no compensation (eight cities) to $6000 per year. One city (Kansas

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[4] The state of Maryland has a single headed employment commission.

City, Kan.) pays on a per meeting basis at the rate of five dollars for each session. It limits the total annual payment, however, to a maximum of $500.

There are fifteen cities in which the annual compensation ranges from $250 (Dayton) to $5000 (New York and Philadelphia) for the commission members. In New York City the president of the commission receives $6000. Generally speaking the most common rate is $1000. This amount is paid by Columbus, Rochester, and Minneapolis. Three cities pay less than $500: Akron, Dayton, and Milwaukee. Taking this group in conjunction with Kansas City, Kan., paying $500 or less, and the several cities offering no compensation,[5] it is evident that the position of civil service commissioner in one-half of the cities under consideration is looked upon as an honorary position and one whose duties are not sufficiently regular and burdensome to call for material financial recognition. It should be noted that in this group of twelve cities are some of the most progressive and representative of our municipalities.

The cities of New York, Detroit, and Syracuse make a differential of $1,000, $500, and $100 respectively, in favor of the president of the commission, whereas in Columbus, the secretary receives a differential of $1280, and in Albany the secretary is the only paid member of the commission, receiving $1000 per year.

Although our returns did not cover this point, it may be assumed that the regular work of the commission is usually administered by a full-time official who is not a member of the commission, but who fills the office both of secretary and chief examiner. In the larger jurisdictions these offices are likely to be separated.

Powers

From the financial point of view the civil service commission has practically no authority. Like other branches of the administration, it is generally entirely dependent on the council or other appropriating body for funds to carry on its functions. Since the typical council, as a political body, is likely to look with little favor on the curbing power of the civil service commission, the former has all too often exercised an effective check on the activities of the commission through limiting its financial resources. This materially affects both the quality and the quantity of the work of the

[5] These cities are Albany, Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, New Haven, and St. Paul.

commission. It has been a prime factor in determining the standards, the achievements, and the reputation of the civil service commission as a municipal agency.

A review of the returns upon which our conclusions are based goes to show that the commissions considered have no levying power and, apart from Milwaukee and Minneapolis,[6] no mandatory control over their own appropriations; also that in two-thirds of the cities the number of employes is determined for the commission by some other agency or is limited by the amount of appropriations granted to it and that in most cases either the salaries of the staff are definitely fixed or are subject to the approval of the council; finally, it is found that the council or the appropriating body fixes the salaries of the commissioners themselves in thirteen of twenty-four cities.

In evaluating the effectiveness of the civil service commission as the agency in government originally established to promote efficiency by the elimination of party and personal politics, the two following conclusions should be given due weight: first, that the commissioners in the typical commission owe their appointments as well as their retention in office to the mayor; and, second, that the council or some other agency controls to all intents and purposes the scope of their activities and the character and size of their force by means of the appropriating power. These two considerations are of basic importance.

Within the field of its own activities, however, the commission usually has a fairly free hand. For instance, it has the power to make its own rules and regulations in fourteen of twenty-three cases. In four of the others, the consent of the legislative body or the mayor is required when changes are made; and in four of the five cities of New York State the approval of the mayor and state civil service commission must first be secured. In practice, however, these restrictions do not seriously limit the freedom of the commission.

The commissions in thirteen cities have sole power to exempt positions from competitive examination. In the cities of New

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[6] It is mandatory that the commission of Milwaukee shall receive .017 of a mill on the assessed valuation of taxable property. The council may in its discretion increase this to .03 of a mill. In Minneapolis the city council is compelled to set aside for civil service purposes "a sum not less than twenty-five (25) dollars for each thousand of the population of the city."

York state other than New York City, the mayor and the state civil service commission must first approve any such exemptions.

Commissions may sit as trial or appeal boards in fourteen of twenty-two cities. The Los Angeles commission, however, does not sit in this capacity for the members of the police and fire departments and the staff of the public library, but does for other employes. On the other hand, the Philadelphia and Toledo commissions [7] limit their activities in this respect to the police and fire departments, and the Cleveland commission to these departments and the classfied employes under the board of education.[8]

The commissions in twenty-two cities appear to have the power to classify the positions in the service according to duties, although in two of these this is doubtful. Eleven are further authorized to recommend proper rates of pay presumably looking toward salary standardization. From four comments, however, it would appear that this is not done, or that, if done, it would have little effect in the cities concerned.

As many as twenty of the twenty-four commissions have power to check and certify payrolls prior to the payment of employes. This power is immensely important in civil service administration, for without it the commission has no effective means of knowing promptly what administrative officials are doing in personnel matters.

In practically all cities (twenty of the total number) the commission is empowered to investigate the operation of the civil service law. In a smaller number, it is vested with even broader powers of investigation. This may cover questions of organization and efficiency of departments. It also includes the authority to recommend changes in line with its findings. The cities in which the civil service commission is endowed with this authority are: Akron, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, and St. Paul. Toledo limits this general function of investigating organization efficiency exclusively to personnel.

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[7] Only the uniformed forces come under this provision in Philadelphia. The classified employes in the board of education are also included in Cleveland.

[8] See also page 32.

Conclusion

The foregoing summary indicates that the character and tenure of office of the typical civil service commission, as represented in the returns from a number of our larger cities, is determined by the chief executive and that the quality and quantity of its work is further determined by the amount of its annual appropriations as voted by the council or other appropriating body. In the technical administration of its functions, we have pointed out that the typical commission largely determines its own rules and regulations, the exemption of positions, their classification on the basis of duties, and that in many cases it may recommend salary changes. Finally, it has been shown that most commissions regularly check payrolls to determine legality of employment and that they have the power to investigate throughout the government both the working of its own law and, in several cities, the administration of all organization units along any and all lines.

CHAPTER III

THE FUNCTIONING OF OUR CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSIONS

Introduction

Of late years there has been considerable dissatisfaction with the functioning of our civil service commissions. A great deal of the public criticism that has appeared, it is true, has come from political sources and may have been animated by purely spoils motives. But this cannot be said of all the criticism. Much of it has come from administrators whose high standing and public achievements entitle them at least to a respectful hearing. Civil service commissioners themselves have frequently complained about their inability, under existing conditions, to cope adequately and fairly with the tasks imposed upon them by law. Newspaper editorial writers have often shown skepticism with regard to the manner in which civil service affairs are administered. Disinterested students of government have not hesitated to point out grave weaknesses in the operation of the merit system. Even the leaders in the civil service reform movement have recently shown signs of disappointment with the commissions that have been brought into being under legislative enactments they have helped to place upon our statute books.

It is the opinion of this committee that this widespread feeling of dissatisfaction is not without cause. While good work has been done in a number of jurisdictions, and while considerable progress has been made in improving the technique of the merit system during the last forty years, on the whole it would appear that our civil service commissions have failed to measure up to reasonable standards and expectations. The considerations that lead the committee to this view are set forth in the following pages.

Commissions Under Political Rather Than Professional Guidance

In the first place, our civil service commissions have been under political rather than under professional guidance. Individual commissioners usually have been appointed more largely on account of their political affiliations than because of their understanding of employment problems. Of the sixty-three com-

missioners with regard to whom the replies to the committee's questionnaire furnished information, only twenty-one had had any considerable experience as employers, twelve were lawyers, twelve others had had no qualifying experience and the rest very little. As indicated in Chapter II of this report, many of the civil service laws place a premium upon political affiliation by requiring tnat more than one party shall be represented on the commission. Such a requirement, while intended to secure non-partisanship in the functioning of the commission, has only operated to force the appointment of men who have been sufficiently conspicuous in party activity to warrant being given political classification. The persons selected were not supposed to be qualified by training and experience for the work of employment administration.

In asserting that individual commissioners usually have been appointed more largely on account of their political affiliations than because of their understanding of employment problems, the committee relies upon its own observations in various civil service jurisdictions throughout the country, as well as upon the returns from the questionnaire. Its view in this matter is also shared by a great number of persons who are in position to speak with authority. For instance Charles Wesley Reed, for many years a member of the State Civil Service Commission of California, recently made the following statement: "The independence and character of the commissioners themselves is the foundation of good administration of the civil service law. I am convinced that the best civil service law on earth could be easily defeated by a pusillanimous commission. Therefore, the great and serious defect of the civil service act of California is that the very commissioners who are called upon to destroy appointments by political favor are themselves the product of the political machine. . . . *In any national convention of civil service men it is the sad fact that a minority are the apostles of light and leading, while the majority seem to be politicians practiced in the ways of politics.*" [9]

Most of the civic workers and others to whom the committee's first questionnaire was addressed indicated that political factors weighed more heavily than personal fitness or previous experience in business or government in determining the personnel of their local commissions. The National Civil Service Reform League,

[9] Transactions of the Commonwealth Club of California, Vol. XVI, No. 9, pp. 323-4, Dec. 1921.

it should also be noted, has been so disturbed by the general incompetence and political character of our civil service commissioners that it has seriously considered the proposition of urging the removal from the chief executive of the power of naming them and placing this power in the hands of a non-partisan board of special examiners.

Merit Principles Not Faithfully Enforced

In the second place, our civil service commissions have left much to be desired in the enforcement of merit principles. This criticism, of course, does not apply equally to all commissions, nor indeed is it intended to apply to every one of them. There have been, and there still are, individual commissions that deserve the highest commendation for their courageous efforts to make the merit system a practical reality, but unfortunately such commissions have been the exceptions rather than the rule. Evidences of failure to enforce merit principles are present in the records of too many of our representative jurisdictions.

Abuse of Provisional Appointments

A very common method of circumventing merit principles is to permit the appointment of provisional employes. To what extent such appointments have been permitted in the various jurisdictions is difficult to determine from the published civil service reports, most of them omitting specific figures on this subject. The recent annual reports of the following commissions, however, do give the number of provisional appointments for 1920 or 1921: New York City, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Buffalo, Milwaukee, Portland, St. Paul, Los Angeles County, Illinois, Ohio, and California. In only one of these eleven important jurisdictions was the ratio of provisional appointments to regular appointments slightly lower than one to five; in one jurisdiction it was as high as two and one-half to one; in another it was almost one and one-half to one; in three it was higher than seven to ten; and in two it was a little over one to five. For the remaining two jurisdictions the ratio of provisional to regular appointments cannot be given, but it is interesting to note that in one of them 38.8 per cent of the employes in the classified service were provisional appointees, and in the other there were 37 per cent more persons serving as provisional employes in the competitive class than as regular employes. According to the report of a civic association in a middle

western city, 2100 out of 2800 of the classified employes outside the police and fire services of that jurisdiction held their positions without examination during the early part of 1922. In view of this information, the committee feels justified in assuming that there is a very real abuse of provisional appointments.

While it frequently happens that provisional appointments have to be allowed because of the inadequacy of the examining staff and its consequent inability to provide the necessary lists of eligibles, yet in many cases such appointments are permitted when there is no real need for doing so. For example, when there is a change in administration, commissioners often succumb to the temptation of abolishing eligible lists established under the preceding administration, thus opening the way for wholesale provisional appointments of persons acceptable to the new political regime. Since a provisional appointee usually has a distinct advantage over other competitors in civil service examinations, this procedure is a convenient method of smoothing the way for the permanent employment of the "friends" of the party in power. Both "reformers" and "gangsters" have had recourse to this expedient, always, of course, with the coöperation of the civil service commission.

In some jurisdictions, a more brazen policy has been followed. Many civil service laws fix a definite time limit beyond which provisional appointees may not be retained on the payroll. Despite these legal restrictions, however, it has become a chronic habit in some localities to continue provisionals in the service for indefinite periods. In a far western city a provisional appointee has remained in the service for almost nineteen years, despite the sixty-day limit imposed in the charter. One of the members of this committee, while acting as chief examiner in a middle western city, had the experience of announcing an examination for an important position which had been occupied by a provisional appointee for many months beyond the legal time limit and then having to cancel that examination by order of the civil service commission, the majority of the members of which did not wish to disturb the political favorite who held the post provisionally.

Exemption of Positions

Another method of defeating merit principles, or at least of confining the scope of their application, is to exempt positions from the operation of civil service rules. Exemptions, to be sure,

may be legitimate. The exercise of the power to exempt, however, has not always been in the interests of the service. All too frequently it has simply made possible the appointment of persons who otherwise would not have been able to qualify for the tasks to be performed. Unfortunately, too, among the positions often exempted are those of the higher grades to which employes in the ranks ought to be able to aspire and which ought to be attainable by civil service methods.

Where the law provides for a "non-competitive" class, favorites are frequently appointed after a perfunctory non-competitive examination instead of being exempted.[10]

Other Violations of Merit Principles

In addition to permitting improper provisional appointments, granting unnecessary exemptions, and making use of the non-competitive examination to bring favorites into the service, civil service commissions have at times invited the accusation of tampering with examinations in the interests of individual applicants. A frequent practice in one jurisdiction has been to advance the ratings of all persons who had taken a given test by five or ten points, thus bringing over the passing line one or more candidates who otherwise have had too low a score to be placed on the list of eligibles. Among other practices of a similar character may be mentioned the inclusion in examinations of questions relating to highly specialized phases of the work in given positions with which only those "on the inside" are familiar, thus giving them an undue advantage over their competitors; the giving of credit for experience gained as a provisional appointee in the position for which the examination is held; and the actual setting aside of whole eligible lists in connection with certain appointments by considering them "inappropriate" for the vacancies to be filled even though they are appropriate.

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[10] On account of the inadequate reporting of most commissions, the extent to which positions have been placed in the exempt and the non-competitive classes is difficult to determine for any large number of jurisdictions, but figures for 1920 and 1921 with regard to five state and ten municipal services may be regarded as fairly typical. In one of these jurisdictions the two classes combined included slightly over 2 per cent of the entire service; in six they included 5 per cent or more, but less than 10 per cent; in three they included 10 per cent or more, but less than 15 per cent; in one they included 17 per cent; and in the remaining four jurisdictions these classes included more than 20 per cent of the entire service, the maximum being 36.5 per cent and the other three ranging from 21.2 per cent to 32 per cent. See also Appendix III, p. 86.

It sometimes happens that a shifting of the political scene results in the public exposure by a state commission of the wrongdoings of a local commission. On such occasions we have brought to light many violations of merit principles that ordinarily remain under cover. Those who are reluctant to believe that such violations have occurred under present and past commissions will find it exceedingly profitable to read such reports as the one made by the State Civil Service Commission of New York of its investigation of the Municipal Civil Service of New York City during 1914. This particular report, it is true, is not free of partisan bias, but its findings were supported in the main by the New York Civil Service Reform Association. From their general knowledge of conditions in different parts of the country, the members of the committee find it difficult to believe that violations such as those recited in the New York report have been wholly confined to the jurisdictions which have been thus exposed to the light of publicity.

Lack of Continuity of Employment Policy

Effect of Political Changes on Employment Policy

In the third place, continuity of employment policy has often not been maintained. To a considerable extent, the merit system has been subject to the fortunes of politics and has gone forward or backward according as the attitude of the administration in office was favorable or unfavorable. Witness the sudden reversal of policy in the Chicago civil service when Mayor Thompson succeeded Mayor Harrison. While there may be doubt as to the wisdom of some of the efficiency projects inaugurated by the civil service commission under the Harrison regime, still it seems most unfortunate that these efforts were so unceremoniously abandoned and that the staff organization it had taken many years to build up was so abruptly and ruthlessly destroyed.[11] Witness also the immediate lowering of civil service standards that followed the political change from Mayor Blankenburg to Mayor Smith in Philadelphia. Whereas under the former administration a high grade examining corps had been recruited and provisional appointments had been kept down to a minimum, under

[11] It should be noted, however, that part of the staff on system and organization was transferred to the finance committee of the city council where it is today.

the latter this examining corps was largely dispersed and provisional appointments were permitted on an enormous scale. Numerous other illustrations might be cited to show how under existing arrangements civil service administration is subject to the whims of passing chief executives and legislatures. As pointed out in Chapter II, in most jurisdictions the legal provisions do not prevent the chief executive from removing a civil commissioner when he desires to do so.

High Turnover of Commissioners

To what extent continuity of employment policy has been interrupted may be gathered from the high rate of turnover of the members of the various civil service commissions. During the last ten years, twelve new appointments have been made to the Municipal Civil Service Commission of New York. Since this commission consists of three members, it would appear that on an average each commissionership has become vacant four times, at intervals of two and one-half years. Chicago has had twenty-five different commissioners during the twenty-three year period from 1895 to 1918. Their length of service varied from three months to eight years and averaged two years and six months. From 1903 to 1920 the members of the civil service commission of the city of Los Angeles averaged three years and one month in office. A somewhat better showing was made in Milwaukee where the average length of service from 1895 to 1915 has been three years and eleven months. In Philadelphia the record has been quite simple. Every four years a new administration has assumed office and brought with it a brand new civil service commission. Buffalo, New York, reports as many as seventeen appointments in ten years to a commission of three members. In Rochester, New York, there has been no change in the personnel of the commission in more than a decade, but this unique situation is explained by the fact that neither has there been any change in the mayorality during that period. Roughly calculated, the average length of service of a civil service commissioner in the jurisdictions from which we have reports has been about three and one-half years, which is less than the average term of office in these jurisdictions, as prescribed in the laws.

The overlapping term of office, which is a feature of many civil service laws, has, it is true, a moderating effect upon the change in the personnel and policy of civil service commissions;

but it is by no means a guarantee of stability. In Chicago, for example, it did not prevent the abrupt change in both personnel and policy that followed Mayor Thompson's accession to office. The reports from other jurisdictions indicate that a new executive usually avails himself of the first opportunity to appoint commissioners of his own choice and in a short time is able to control the commission.

Inadequate Performance of Employment Functions

In the fourth place, our civil service commissions have not adequately performed all the employment functions of government. This count in the committee's indictment has its extenuating circumstances. As indicated in the opening chapter, it was not until recent years that even the leaders in the civil service reform movement attached any high degree of importance to the positive aspect of civil service administration. Since this aspect, however, is now coming to be recognized as of moment, it seems proper at least to record the fact that our commissions have not given it the emphasis it deserves. Moreover, from the standpoint of future needs, the function of developing morale and efficiency and of caring for the welfare of employes really looms larger than some of the purely regulatory and negative activities in which commissions have been so largely engaged in the past.

The Older Functions of Civil Service Commissions

Among the older functions belonging to the personnel agency of government may be mentioned the following:

1. Establishing and maintaining contacts with sources of labor supply.

2. Testing the qualifications of applicants for employment.

3. Testing the relative fitness of employes for promotion.

4. Classifying positions according to duties and establishing lines of promotion.

5. Examining the fairness and adequacy of the compensation of employes and recommending proper rates of pay to the legislative body.

6. Passing upon cases of discipline and dismissal to see that injustice is not done to employes.

7. Preparing, installing, and supervising service records and efficiency ratings.

8. Compiling information with regard to the employment operations of the service, such as examination results, turnover data, analysis of separations, and the like.

Partial Performance of Older Functions

Some of these functions have been performed at one time or another by all of the civil service commissions in the country; and a few of them are being performed continuously by all of the commissions, with varying degrees of efficiency. In most jurisdictions, however, only a part of these functions have been attempted, the rest being practically ignored or performed in a most perfunctory manner.

All of the civil service commissions throughout the country have established and maintain certain contacts with the sources of labor supply. In some jurisdictions these contacts consist of nothing more than notices on the official bulletin board and routine advertisements in the local newspapers. During times of labor surplus these methods are quite adequate to meet the needs of the service, but when employment is general they fail to reach a sufficient number of desirable applicants to give the commission much choice in its recruiting work. In other jurisdictions official notices and advertisements are supplemented by contacts with schools, colleges, labor unions, and professional groups. The Milwaukee civil service commission has adopted the ingenious method of advertising the city service on the backs of the water bills that are sent out to users of water throughout the city, and the Baltimore commission has notices of tests flashed on the movie screens. In the state of Massachusetts a special publicity agent has been employed to bring the needs and the opportunities of the civil service of that state before the public.

All of the civil service commissions make at least some effort to test the qualifications of applicants for employment. In some jurisdictions these tests are still very crude, whereas in others they have been developed to a high degree of refinement. Generally speaking it may be said that the examinations of civil service commissions are far superior to the selective processes still employed in the average private business establishment. They are, however, by no means perfect even in the most advanced jurisdictions. That progress is being made toward better methods of selection is indicated in the replies to the committee's questionnaire. Out of twenty-eight jurisdictions from which reports were received

twenty-five are said to have made progress recently toward more "practical" types of examination.

Most civil service commissions appear to exercise some sort of control over promotions, but in many instances this control is perfunctory. In only half the jurisdictions from which the committee had replies is any considerable number of positions filled by promotions in which examinations play an important part.

It has been only during the last fifteen years that civil service commissions have begun to classify positions according to duties so as to make possible an equitable scheme of promotion and the fixing of standard rates of compensation. Of twenty-eight jurisdictions from which we had replies twenty appear to have classified positions according to duties. In only fifteen jurisdictions, however, is the classification kept current by the civil service commission; in only twelve has an equitable salary scale been set up on the basis of the classification; and in only nine does the civil service commission examine the fairness and adequacy of the compensation of employes and recommend changes in the salary scale to the legislative body.

Some indication has already been given in Chapter II as to the prevalence of the trial board plan in those civil service jurisdictions from which we have reports. It might be added here that the civil service commissions of Maryland and New Jersey, and practically all of the commissions in the states of Ohio, Illinois, and California have the legal power to pass upon cases of discipline and dismissal to see that injustice is not done to employes. In addition to these commissions those of Milwaukee, Seattle, and Portland, Oregon, have the same power.

While there has been considerable experimentation with efficiency records during the last decade, yet very few commissions have thus far made them the basis of administrative action. In less than one-third of the jurisdictions from which the committee had replies are efficiency records used in determining promotions, and in only one-tenth are such records employed in connection with salary increments.

Most civil service commissions compile some statistical material with regard to employment operation. This material, however, is seldom sufficient for computing labor turnover cost, or for analyzing causes of separation; it does not in fact furnish the type of information which is of value for purposes of employment control.

The New Employment Functions

If our civil service commissions are to meet the newer demands that are sure to be made upon them the following functions will also have to be included in their employment program:

1. Promoting and organizing the instruction of new employes.

2. Promoting the establishment of standard policies in respect to working conditions, health, and safety.

3. Promoting the establishment of standard practices in regard to hours of employment, vacations, holidays, and sick leaves.

4. Promoting and encouraging recreational and social activities among employes.

5. Establishing methods of transfer rather than discharge of employes wherever possible.

6. Carrying on research for the purpose of improving the administration of employment policies.

New Functions Mostly Untouched

Most of these functions have remained almost entirely untouched by the vast majority of the civil service commissions throughout the country. So far as the committee is aware, only three or four commissions have made any considerable effort to promote the organization and conduct of classes of instruction either for employes just entering the service or for old employes seeking promotion. In none of the cities answering the questionnaire, except Toledo and Houston, has the civil service commission concerned itself with physical working conditions of employes in the operating departments. Only a few commissions in the central and western sections of the country have given any attention to the problem of establishing uniform policies in regard to hours of employment, vacations, holidays, and sick leaves. The Wisconsin commission is the only one of which the committee knows that has taken any kind of leadership in promoting recreational activities among the members of the civil service. While transfers are permitted under the usual civil service rules, it does not appear that any commission has taken upon itself the task of reducing dismissals and other separations from the service by transferring misplaced employes to other offices or departments. Research for the purpose of improving the administration of employment policies may be said to be practically non-existent in most jurisdictions.

Causes of This Condition

It may be contended that our civil service commissions have not performed their functions more adequately because they have not had the funds to do so. This, of course, is perfectly true. As a rule the examiners and the other employes of our commissions do all that is possible for them considering their small number and inadequate pay. But, lacking funds, the average commission plods along with inadequate assistance and hence confines itself to the most urgent phases of the large task imposed by the civil service law. On the surface, therefore, it would appear that the failure of legislative bodies to provide sufficient funds for the work of our commissions is the primary cause of the present inadequate performance of employment functions.

Closer observation, however, reveals the fact that civil service commissions are themselves at least partially to blame. In many cases they have received insufficient funds because they have been half-hearted in their work and have not always made as much effort as they should to impress upon legislative bodies their need of larger appropriations. The committee has known of civil service commissions that not only failed to appeal for more adequate appropriations, but acquiesced in actual reductions in the funds allotted them, and in a few cases even recommended reductions in the name of economy!

Politicians do not want the merit system. Existing civil service commissions, being political in character, naturally are not aggressive in the cause of real civil service reform. That is an important reason why they fail to obtain adequate financial support. It is in the character of our commissions themselves, therefore, that we shall find one of the primary causes of the present inadequate performance of the employment functions of government.

Employment Administration Not Democratic

Finally we have not had democratic administration of the employment affairs of our city governments. The typical civil service commission of today is representative of the management, but not at all of the workers. Neither have any of our municipal commissions put forth a great deal of effort to devise machinery for securing employe participation in determining conditions of employment.

Thus far the nearest approach to workers' participation has been the organization of personnel committees. Such committees are now found in the civil service of New York state, and in a few other units of government. As yet, however, these committees have not become important factors in personnel administration.

Conclusion

The foregoing criticisms of our civil service commissions are not made without a sense of appreciation of the good work that individual commissions throughout the country have done. Notable progress in many phases of employment administration has been made in a considerable number of jurisdictions, and on the whole our civil service laws today are much more efficiently administered than they were several decades ago. Especial mention should be made of the conscientious endeavor of many of the examining staffs throughout the country and of their loyal devotion to the cause of the merit system. To their efforts is due much of the advance that has been made. It is the opinion of the committee, however, that the forward movement in this field of governmental administration has been too slow, and that unless fundamental changes are made in the make-up of our civil service commissions it will continue to be slow in the future. The committee believes, moreover, that it is not necessary to keep on at this snail's pace and that progress can be hastened. With this thought in mind, it has endeavored to outline in the final chapter of this report certain suggestions for the improvement of civil service administration in this country, with special reference to the make-up of the civil service commission.

CHAPTER IV

CIVIL SERVICE CONTROL ABROAD

Introduction

In one of those illuminating opinions prepared for the Supreme Court by Justice Holmes, he is reported to have written "that historical continuity with the past is not a duty, it is only a necessity." This holds for students and observers of most of the older and many of the newer institutions in the United States. These institutions cannot well be understood nor explained without reference to what used to be called the "mother country." Particularly is this opinion applicable to public administration, including, as it happens, those methods of civil service control that are now current with us. Our federal civil service law of 1883, which has been more or less faithfully copied by a number of governmental units in this country, is, for instance, to be traced to England with peculiar directness. Beginning in 1877, Dorman B. Eaton undertook, at the request of President Hayes, a careful investigation of the civil service in England. In 1880 his work on the British civil service appeared. It served as the basis of the successful propaganda for civil service control in the United States that finally culminated in the Act of 1883. This legislation was drawn up by Mr. Eaton. After its enactment he was appointed to serve on the first commission of the federal government and thus became jointly responsible for the administrative procedure originally adopted by the commission. Thus it would appear that there has been "historical continuity" in the development of civil service control in the United States.

It is the primary purpose of this chapter to provide the background that will indicate that our civil service administration is not a sporadic and isolated phenomenon, but rather part and parcel of an orderly and a developing process. This applies to the initial stage of civil service control, namely that of selection on the basis of competitive examination. But we may also assume that other phases of employment administration that have recently been incorporated into civil service policy abroad will serve as the basis for predicting similar developments in this country.

The following discussion will be divided into three parts: the first dealing with the competitive examination as the bed rock

of civil service control, past and present; the second dealing with the expansion of the functions of the civil service commission by centralizing employment control under it; and the third considering the increasing recognition of the point of view of the employes in matters of compensation, conditions of work, and similar problems.

Competitive Examinations

Historical Background

England was the forerunner of other countries in the establishment of formal entrance examinations as a means of raising standards of efficiency in the public service. Such examinations, which were qualifying tests rather than anything else, were introduced as a result of an investigation carried on by a royal commission in 1853.

Since the tests were given only to those candidates who had been previously nominated by the higher officials in the given department, this was commonly called limited competition.[12] The period 1855-1870 is consequently referred to as the period of limited competition. It was followed by the period of open competition, that is, selection on the basis of "a written examination in literary or scientific subjects open to all candidates." Such examinations were prescribed for entrance to the clerical and administrative positions in the government service by an Order of Council in 1870. Since that date this must be regarded as the normal method of entry. As time has passed, moreover, it has been continuously extended to cover more and more positions so that now the majority of positions in the higher grades of the English public service are filled by open competition. In the minor grades the principles of open competition are preserved in that candidates are not nominated but the examinations themselves are qualifying rather than competitive.

Present Status of Competitive System in England

In spite of a certain amount of more or less inevitable criticism of the civil service commission and its method of carrying on examinations, there can in the main be no question concerning the general support of this system in England whether it be among

[12] Limited competition usually applies now to selection that is limited to candidates already employed in the civil service.

members of Parliament, representatives of the administration, the associations of employes, or throughout the great public itself. Sir Charles Trevelyan, at one time appointed by Gladstone to serve on a special commission investigating the civil service, made a statement some forty-five years ago that is undoubtedly true today. He expressed himself in the following terms:

> "All real opposition to it has long since died away. No sane person has any idea of abrogating it and reviving the former state of things. There is no sign of any movement against it from any quarter."

Two other commissions—one in 1886 and another in 1914—gave support to the sweeping assertion made above. One section of the report of the latter body[13] summarizes its conviction on this matter in the following words:

> "With the progress of this development the Civil Service has grown until at the present time the State possesses a body of public officers who are far more competent and zealous than their predecessors, appointed under the regime of patronage, are stated on official authority to have been. We have no doubt whatever that to this highly satisfactory result the system of competitive examination has mainly contributed. The system has, in our opinion, entirely justified the expectations of its originators. It is true that it never has been, and is not now, exempt from hostile criticism, and we do not affirm that the written examination is an infallible or a final test of the best results of education. But . . . the advantages of the system of competitive examination as a means of recruitment for the Civil Service far outweigh any defects which have come to our notice, and we are convinced of the importance not only of adhering to the system, but of extending it wherever possible."

Development in the British Colonies

Perhaps the most telling testimony, however, to the success of the competitive examination as a means of improving the administration of government is found in the fact that wherever the English government has extended its sphere of activity, that is in the British colonies and other dependencies, civil service control on the basis of the merit system has become an integral part of the administration. The various Australian states, New

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[13] Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Service, page 31.

Zealand, and Canada are to be cited as offering ample evidence for the success of the form of control with which we are here dealing. In some respects, in fact, the civil service commission, or public service board as it is commonly called in Australia, has outdistanced the mother country. Reference will be made to outstanding differences in a later section.

Exceptional Condition in English Local Governments

In concluding this section, passing reference should be made to the local governments in England, *i. e.,* the municipalities. It is to be noted that despite the extensive scope of municipal undertakings in many cities in England and the consequent size and responsibilities of the body of civil workers competitive examinations are not in vogue.[14] The explanation doubtless is that there has not been the same need of checking the qualifications of new entrants into the municipal service as in the central government. There has never been any officer in the English cities, for instance, who corresponded to the so-called "Patronage Secretary," a recognized adjunct of the administration of the national government in the good old days. The fact of the matter is that patronage has not been so considerable a factor in staff appointments in English, Canadian, and other municipalities as with us. Two of the most competent observers of English municipal government, namely Lowell and Redlich, agree that even though politics may have something to do with the appointment of the permanent city officials, it does not justify the selection of the undeserving nor is it a common cause of dismissal or other political reprisals. Indeed Lowell is inclined to ascribe the excellence of the local government to the quality and influence of the permanent officials.

Another factor that promises to become of increasing importance should be cited in explanation of the absence of competitive tests. It is the influence exerted by the associations of municipal workers on the personnel standards of the groups concerned. They already render aid in setting and maintaining standards, thus making it more difficult for the incompetent and untrained to enter special branches of the government service. In dealing with organizations of employes in the final section of this chapter, further discussion will be found concerning the significance of these professional associations.

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[14] The largest municipality, the London County Council, is an exception. Its entrance system is closely copied after the national civil service.

Distribution of Employment Authority

The distribution of authority for employment matters among considerable numbers of administrators has been a prolific cause of irregularities and consequent injustice and discontent among public employes as well as among workers in private industry. It also has made for wasteful operation and a low level of efficiency. That one should find in some of the countries abroad a tendency toward greater centralization of employment control is therefore not at all surprising.

England, with its traditions of administration more definitely fixed, has held rather tenaciously to old customs and has been comparatively slow to adopt newer methods. But here too the tendency toward service-wide standardization is gradually forging ahead. It is in the government of the dominions, however, that centralization of employment control under a single responsible agency has made most progress. In Canada, New Zealand, and the states of Australia, the functions of the civil service commission have been expanded to include duties that pertain to employment control and in most cases, what is more, also to cover functions that properly belong to a bureau of administration and efficiency.

The Situation in England

The situation in England is in a state of flux at the present time. The one constant seems to be the civil service commission. Apparently, it is expected that it will continue as heretofore as the examining agency without undergoing either curtailment or expansion of duties.

It appears likely, however, that the Treasury will exercise more and more those functions that properly belong to a central employment department.

Both the most recent royal commission on civil service, to which reference has previously been made, and a special board of commissioners reporting in 1919 to the Treasury on organization and staffing, urged that the Treasury be strengthened with a view to exercising more effective control over the organization of the civil service and that a special division be created in the Treasury for that purpose.

The functions contemplated for the Treasury may be summarized under the following heads:[15]

1. To watch over general conditions and activities of the civil service with a view to its effective economic employment.
2. To make suggestions to the head of the department.
3. To secure machinery for recognizing and rewarding exceptional cases of ability and merit.
4. To bring about transfers if such transfers are to the advantage of the service.
5. To carry out inquiries and investigations into any matters connected with the departmental administration of methods of work.

The Commission on Organization and Staffing is even more specific in that it recommends the creation of an Establishment Division of the Treasury as well as the appointment of an Establishment Officer in each department whose business would be to cooperate with the Treasury division. The Establishment Division would supply the need of permanent staff management, being responsible for the adoption of uniform regulations covering selection, probation, promotion, placement, transfer, sick leave, and superannuation. It would also serve as a clearing house for records, better methods of management, the installation of labor-saving devices, and the like.

As a result of these recommendations and the need for more efficient administration a Controller of Establishments has been appointed as a member of the Treasury staff. His office comprises wide powers that were formerly distributed among several persons. A woman officer has also been appointed to deal largely with employment questions concerning women.

Further impetus toward centralized control by the Treasury is given by the National Whitley Council which was organized for the administrative departments of the central government in 1919.

This council consists of fifty-four members appointed in equal numbers by the government and the associations of employes. Its constitution gives it a very broad commission, enabling it to recommend on questions that range from remuneration to the improvement of office machinery and organization.

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[15] Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Service, page 87.

The council works by agreement between the official and staff representatives. If no agreement is reached the matter under discussion lapses. If agreement is reached, the decisions become operative and binding on both sides. The procedure for the official side is to get such instructions as are necessary from the Treasury or in special cases from the Cabinet during the negotiations, and for the staff side to get similar instructions from the associations which comprise it. In case of agreement, the administration of the order is vested in the Treasury or the particular government department concerned, the staff side having only the right to criticize in the event of dissatisfaction with methods of administration.

The records of the orders growing out of agreements emanating from the Whitley Council already cover vital employment matters as, for instance, recruitment, classification and salary scales, and methods and lines of promotion.[16] When it is considered that the constitution of the National Whitley Council authorizes it to investigate and report "on matters affecting the civil service with a view to increased efficiency in the public service, combined with the well-being of those employed," we may predict that the Treasury will of necessity concern itself more and more with employment policy and thus become increasingly the established centre of personnel administration. The whole policy that has resulted from the Whitley Council procedure goes to support this forecast.

In the Dominions

In a minority report on the question of central supervision and control of personnel policy, Sir Kenneth Muir Mackenzie, an eminent legal authority, strongly urged that the Treasury should not be given the responsibility that was recommended by the majority members of the Royal Commission on Civil Service, but rather that some independent body should be chosen. He concluded his comments by suggesting that if "the civil service commission were properly constituted, it would more nearly approach what is required."[17]

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[16] According to G. H. Stuart Bunning, vice-chairman of the National Whitley Council, Whitley committees have also been consulted by staff representatives of the civil service commission as to the syllabus of examination and entrance conditions.

[17] Fourth Report of the Royal Commission on Civil Service, page 116.

The dominions which have been less hampered by tradition and a strongly entrenched central department, such as the Treasury, have adopted the policy outlined by Mr. Mackenzie. That is to say, the civil service commission, or public service board, as it is usually called in the Australian states, has been given a broad charter both to supervise and control all conditions affecting the civil service and also to investigate any and all phases of departmental management that make for efficiency and economy. The latter provision covers departmental organization, organization of work, use of labor-saving devices, and similar matters. This obviously goes well beyond what is ordinarily assigned to the division in charge of personnel. It may be explained as due to the close relation between the size and quality of the staff and the whole work policy and scheme of organization, but it is also due to the apparent need of having a clearing house for information as to the most approved methods of administration and of a centre for coordinating the work of the various departments. At any rate. legislation in New South Wales (1902), in Canada (1918), in South Australia (1916), and Queensland (1920), and the proposed act for regulating the public service in the Commonwealth of Australia, imposes the double function described above on the public service commissioners.[18]

If space permitted it would be well worth while to summarize the activities described in the annual reports of these commissions in order to indicate that the manifold duties prescribed in the law have been faithfully and, in some cases, most thoroughly carried out as regards both personnel and general administration.

For example, the Queensland commission has paid much attention to recruiting junior employes from the schools and to training those already in the service for advancement. It has also gone into the matter of providing adequate housing for the employes in the outlying districts. In the last report for New South Wales, considerable space was given to the justification of periodic tests as a means of stimulating zeal for promotion and of broadening the equipment and outlook of the civil servants. The question of standard provisions for travel expenses and the necessary means of transportation is considered in three or four of the reports. Standardization of leaves, holidays and overtime remuneration, as well

[18] It should be noted, as a matter of incidental interest, that Victoria, Queensland, South Australia, and the province of Ontario have but a single commissioner.

as the matter of appeals, discipline, and dismissal, are given more of less attention in most of the annual reports. In short "the placing of all staff matters and appointments under the jurisdiction of the public service commission," to quote the last annual report from South Australia, "is in operation in all states of Australia and New Zealand."

The foregoing brief review will indicate how truly the civil service or public service commission has become the central employment agency of the governments concerned. There is in fact practically no function normally performed by the best personnel departments in the field of private employment which has not been performed by one or more of the civil service commissions under review.

Employes' Representation

In England

The most elaborate scheme for employes' representation is to be found in the National Whitley Council for the administrative and legal departments of the civil service and the governmental industrial establishments in Great Britain. In the former alone there were, in 1920, sixty-five official joint councils in the various departments and divisions. Over 300,000 employes come within the scope of the Whitley Councils. On account of the importance and extent of this machinery for bringing about a greater measure of coöperation between the state as employer and the general body of civil servants, the functions of the National Whitley Council are summarized below:

1. Provision of the best means for utilizing the ideals and experience of the staff.
2. Means for securing to the staff a greater share in and responsibility for the determination and observance of the conditions under which their duties are carried out.
3. Determination of the general principles governing conditions of service, *e. g.*, recruitment, hours, promotion, discipline, tenure, remuneration, and superannuation.
4. The encouragement of the further education of civil servants and their training in higher administration and organization.

5. Improvement of office machinery and organization and the provision of opportunities for the full consideration of suggestions by the staff on this subject.
6. Proposed legislation so far as it has a bearing upon the position of civil servants in relation to their employment.

The actual achievements, as indicated in an earlier section, and the comprehensive program for the Whitley Council just outlined, go to show that we have here to do with a factor in public administration that is to all appearances of permanent significance.

In the Dominions

Not alone in the English government, but in some of the dominions the much discussed "sharing in responsibility" on the part of the workers has become more than a slogan. What Mr. Story, of the Royal Commissioners of Queensland,[19] states in a special report is virtually subscribed to by the commissioners from Canada, New South Wales, South Australia, and is also provided for in a special bill under consideration for the Commonwealth of Australia. Among a number of general observations, Mr. Story remarks that "Public Service Unions and Associations have become institutions." As Public Service Commissioner he, therefore, arranges for weekly meetings with representatives of the State Service Associations so that they may bring before him and discuss with him grievances and general matters that come within their purview. In his judgment "these meetings are tending to make the wheels of public service administration run more smoothly." To indicate how far official recognition goes and what the prospects are for growing coöperation with the associations, reference might be made to Mr. Story's proposal that an advisory committee on training be appointed to consist of representatives from the associations, the university departments, and his own office.

In other states the commissioners usually take cognizance of the employes' associations in connection with machinery for appeals. This is particularly true in New South Wales where the Industrial Arbitration Act (1919) enables public servants to seek awards from the Industrial Arbitration Court. This act in itself facilitates and expedites the registration of employes' organizations

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[19] Report of Royal Commission on Classification for Queensland (1919), page 45.

so that now a large majority of the employes come under the decisions of the court.

Finally, the bill now under consideration by the Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia makes detailed provision for an Appeal Board to handle appeals arising from disciplinary action taken by administrative officials. In one section (Division 6, Subhead 5-e), it is provided that one of the three members of the board shall be the elected representative of the division to which the appellant belongs. The Public Service Board is empowered in the law to prescribe methods for the selection of such representatives.

Still other instances might be cited to indicate how definitely the principle of employes' representation has been recognized in established civil service procedure or in the basic law. The coöperation of the employes in the management of their own affairs would, therefore, seem to be keeping pace in England and its dominions with the similar movement in private industry.

In English Municipalities

As previously stated, voluntary associations of municipal employes are an important factor in determining standards in local government units. These associations comprise the brain-working as well as other groups.[20] The National Association of Local Government Officers which is open to all civil workers not otherwise organized, includes both administrative officials and unskilled manual workers. The professional associations are limited to those engaged in the same line of work, as, for instance, the various groups of engineers, the accountants, sanitary inspectors, and rate collectors. Each has its national association.[21]

All of the above organizations have a two-fold function: (1) to improve their own working conditions; and (2) to improve the technique and standing of their several vocations. It need not be supposed that the associations are engrossed in the former to the exclusion of the latter function. In an admirable review of the organizations of brain-workers,[22] Mr. and Mrs. Webb dilate

[20] As a whole, the manual workers have been more concerned with the wage issue than anything else, but there are indications that they are becoming actively interested in problems of management.

[21] A national association of local government officers was formed under the Whitley Council scheme, but before it was well under way it broke down (1921) because of the unwillingness of certain associations of administrative officials to coöperate.

[22] The New Statesman, Supplement to Volume IX, 1917 (33 ff).

upon the exceptional devotion to the particular branch of municipal service in which the members of the associations are engaged. They illustrate by referring to the professional associations of Poor Law Officials which "stand up, not only for themselves, by also for the poor law itself." On the whole it seems to the authors that the influence of the associations has been "in favor of an increase in efficiency of the work of the local authorities, and that they have greatly improved the technique of their vocations."

Among the specific tasks undertaken by some of the organizations should be mentioned the setting up of minimum qualifications for membership in the association for standing in the vocation. In one of the most recent estimates of the public service in England,[23] the writer considers that "the movement toward professional qualification that is accompanied by keen and vigorous interest in the advancement of professional knowledge is the most striking characteristic of the municipal civil service voluntary organizations." It should be pointed out that some of these associations themselves make arrangements for training and even give examinations or require the completion of an academic course as a prerequisite to entrance into the association. This is particularly true of the National Association of Local Government Officers, the largest of these organizations. Nalgo, as it is called, is now developing an elaborate correspondence school; it conducts examinations and issues diplomas; it is also coöperating with local educational authorities "with the object of instructing teachers to select and prepare specially suitable pupils for entrance into the local government service."

To indicate in what friendly relations the administrative authorities stand to the professional associations, attention might be called to the fact that certain councils and boroughs require that candidates for appointment shall have passed the examinations set up by the National Association of Local Government Officers.[24] In fact this coöperation between the administration and the associations and "the constantly increasing recognition of the latter as organs of control by the government" seem to the Webbs to be specially noteworthy.[25]

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[23] Wm. A. Robson: From Patronage to Proficiency in the Public Service, the Fabian Society, 1922. (Cf. page 34.)

[24] Cf. From Patronage to Proficiency in the Public Service, p. 31.

[25] Cf. Supplement to The New Statesman, p. 45.

Conclusion

We have aimed in this chapter to indicate that the civil service commission as a means of improving the administration of government is not an untried and experimental institution. It grew not out of a preconceived theory, but out of intolerable conditions which made for waste and inefficiency. The expansion of function is also in response to the wide-felt need of a central agency that will concern itself with personnel matters and thus keep the personnel of the public service on a high level of efficiency.

Finally, we referred to the growing tendency of the state as employer to recognize the right of employes to self-expression and a hearing on conditions affecting their own well-being, but we also indicated the advantages that may accrue when the workers are given a fuller opportunity of contributing from their own experience and knowledge to the improvement of work processes and procedure.

It is the conviction of the writers of this report that much profit may be derived by our own administrators from the experiments in civil service control that are being tried out in foreign countries. In some directions it is already possible to gauge their value by pointing to positive advances that have resulted. If our observations and conclusions are valid, it would seem as though "historical continuity" pointed with a good deal of definiteness to the course that we should adopt in the interest of future progress in this country.

CHAPTER V

EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION IN PRIVATE INDUSTRY

Introduction

In commenting on the new standards as to the working conditions in private industry adopted in England during the war, Lloyd George remarked that it was strange that war, the engine of destruction, should have been responsible for the introduction of a more humane policy in the treatment of the working people. In the United States this policy has been more consistently developed and rather better defined than in England. For instance, many of our progressive establishments have put this phase of management on an equal footing with other major administrative functions. Finance, production, sales, and personnel are frequently found on the same level in the organization charts of leading American concerns.

Quite in accordance with scientific procedure that is now the order of the day among our foremost business organizers, the field of employment administration was subjected to the same painstaking analysis and interpretation as other phases of the enterprise. As a consequence, industrial hygiene, industrial physiology, psychology, and training have made wonderful strides during and since the war. There are now, for example, over 2000 industrial physicians scattered through the factories of the country. A corporation of eminent psychologists has just been formed to set up trade and other tests that will make possible a more scientific selection and placement of employes. Economists and statisticians have been requisitioned as well to work out scientific salary scales and payment schemes that will give due weight to the cost of living, the value of the individual output, and the like.

Finally, industrial engineers are engaged in increasing production by means of job specifications, by standardizing methods of work and devising rating systems that will more accurately gauge the worker's efforts and, at the same time, serve as an incentive to increased effort. Another type of industrial engineer is inaugurating plans of organization of the workers so that they may become more articulate and have a real share in those aspects of administration that specially affect them.

Growth of These Functions

Simultaneously with the development of more scientific procedure along the several lines noted, the functions of the employment department in individual establishments have been constantly expanding. After hiring and firing, the primary employment functions, had been somewhat centralized in one office, other related duties naturally crystallized about them. This may be illustrated by referring to the changes in policy and other developments that resulted from the recognition of the wastefulness of firing and voluntary quits. In the first place, these losses were translated into dollars and cents by means of turnover records and cost studies. The amounts involved were a revelation to the management. In order to reduce this obvious and unnecessary waste, efforts have been made to install a better system of placement and follow-up and to introduce a training procedure and systematic transfer and promotion policy.

Turnover Studies

The turnover chart served further as a general fever chart of employment conditions. A rise in the curve indicated the need of diagnosis of causes and the introduction of corrective measures. The analysis of causes often led then more or less inevitably to material changes in the salary scale, in working conditions, in the relations between foreman or supervisor and the workers. It became the business of the employment manager to anticipate the danger of turnover and to forestall it by recommending the adoption of sound and up-to-date policies along various lines. In the name of anticipation of this danger the wide-awake manager has found it particularly worth while to establish definite channels for grievances and suggestions. By these means he discovers potential causes for turnover so that the necessary measures may be taken to remedy the situation.

Recreation and Health

In concluding the program of a typical employment department, mention is also to be made of the interest of the department in the man at play and the man in health or ill-health. In the former matter, the department itself may direct or it may simply stimulate the organization of athletic teams of various sorts, of excursions, outings, and the like.

PERSONNEL DEPARTMENT: ITS FUNCTIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE DIVISIONS.



Reproduced from Personnel Administration, its Principles and Practice, by Ordway Tead and H. C. Metcalf, McGraw-Hill Book Co., Page 40.

In the case of ill-health, many plants and commercial organizations have their own staff of physicians, nurses, and dentists. Annual physical examinations and advice to those who are below par form an integral part of the health program. It is also quite customary for some to send a nurse to visit every absent member of the force on the day of absence. This assures the absentee of the interest of his employer and is a means of seeing to it that he has the attention necessary for the speediest possible recovery.

The foregoing summary of the functions of the modern personnel department goes to show that there is nothing pertaining to the workman in which the employer does not have some interest. This does not always spring from the spirit of paternalism, but among the more enlightened employers at least from the consciousness that the employe's work-life is at the centre of his whole life and that in it and through it he should have the opportunity for the fullest possible satisfaction, expression, and development.

The chart on page 51 will help visualize the scope of activities now carried on by a well-organized employment department. It may serve as a blanket summary of the preceding discussion of functions as administered by a centralized division of personnel.

Application to Public Employment—the Differences

Although there are marked differences between the conditions affecting employment that are met with in private enterprise and public administration, the differences not alone fall far short of outbalancing the similarities, but the differences themselves emphasize the need of centralizing employment control and supervision.

Absence of Profit Incentive

The absence of the incentives that come from keen competition and the struggle for profits in the business world is one reason for rather than against the establishment of an employment agency with such powers as we have been discussing. One of its chief tasks should be the working out of substitute incentives for the ones mentioned. Public recognition, pride in work well done, and the satisfaction that may come from public service itself are motives that are capitalized all too rarely in governmental employment. But no one who knows foreign countries will deny that these may become incentives with real driving power and in many cases even superior to the incentive of self-enrichment and position in the realm of business.

Political Influences

On the other hand, a factor that is more pervasive in public than in private employment is the influence of political character. This again accentuates the need of a well-administered employment policy. Only by the aid of sound and above-board methods of selection, efficiency ratings, salary increases, promotions, and dismissals can the sub-surface influences of politics be minimized. If these are supplemented by machinery for the airing of grievances and possibly by some scheme of representation through which opinions and objections may be registered, real progress will be made against the injustice that is generally felt to be, and that all too often is, inherent in public employment.

High Turnover of Public Officials

A third difference of major importance that is peculiar to the administration of government is the ceaseless flow of administrative officials whose period of activity is comparatively limited. This makes impossible continuity of policy which is obviously essential if justice is to prevail. Furthermore, since many such officials qualify according to political rather than administrative standards, the danger of arbitrary and uncalled-for changes in established policy and practice is increased. This again emphasizes the desirability of centralized employment control that will be firmly based on the consistent recognition and stimulation of merit.

Application to Public Employment—the Similarities

Turning from the differences between public and private employment, let us consider the similarities. The latter may be cited as obvious arguments for the adoption of those methods of personnel supervision and control that have been tried and proved by enterprising private employers.

Impersonal Methods of Dealing with Workers

In the first place, impersonal methods of dealing with human beings have been inherent in both systems because of the great body of workers involved. The returns to the committee's questionnaires show, for instance, that only six of the municipalities from which total figures of classified and unclassified employes were received have less than 1000 names on the payroll. Exclusive of New York with 57,648 and Philadelphia with 17,649 workers, the average number of employes for twenty-six municipalities is 3098.

Just as in large scale industry, the nature and exigencies of public organization have necessarily brought about a segregation of the responsible, policy-determining public officials and the rank and file of the workers. Segregation has inevitably involved increasing inaccessability and consequent lack of understanding and sympathy. To bridge this gap is one of the tasks of functionalized employment management.

The employment department becomes thus the human relations department. It vitalizes and humanizes the necessary machinery of control. In order to keep up the flow of personal contacts so necessary for fruitful coöperation, it not only keeps the door open to all who have a grievance, but it also stimulates expression and suggestion by the organization of plant committees and other representative agencies.

Industry has gone to school to politics and learned that some form of representation is necessary if large bodies of workers are to be made articulate and are to develop the habit of self-expression. This contact has led to what is now commonly called industrial democracy. The employment division has been an important factor in bringing about whatever degree of industrial democracy we have in our industrial and business life. It is reasonable to assume that the representative system now so generally and so advantageously adopted in large concerns is one of the most effective arms of the employment department. Through the latter the force of the ideas and viewpoints of the rank and file on employment matters is felt, interpreted, and utilized.

Entirely apart from the propriety of carrying on administration of government in this democratic country in a more democratic way, it is a fair question to ask whether the efficiency of our governmental units might not be increased by mobilizing the interest and coöperation of the civil servants along the democratic lines mapped out by enterprising private employers.

The notable experiment undertaken in the Post Office Department of the federal government has developed far enough to justify an affirmative answer to this question. After nine months Mr. Hays claimed that the changed relations between the supervisory staff and the rank and file amounted to the addition of thousands of men to the force. This favorable judgment was borne out by the commendatory expressions as to the increased efficiency of the service that came in from numerous chambers of commerce. More recent statements made by Henry S. Dennison, the present wel-

fare director of the largest of our departments, go to indicate that the possibilities of this movement have not yet been fully sounded.

Unquestionably one of the problems confronting progressive public administrators is the low morale of civil workers. Lack of interest and lack of initiative which are accompanied and perhaps largely caused by the highly developed sense of self-protection as noted by ex-Secretary Lane, constitute nothing less than a national problem of serious proportions. If government is ready to take a leaf out of the book of industrial leaders, it will develop a personnel policy and administer it with reference to the democratic impulses of our time.

Dependence on Subordinates for Execution of Policy

Secondly, mass organization also brings in its trail the necessity of depending on subordinates for the execution of policy. Even though the chief administrator may be interested in putting an enlightened personnel policy into effect, his plans may easily be frustrated by lack of coöperation on the part of his subordinates. In industry one hears much of "foremanizing" and training of executives. These are tasks that properly belong to the personnel division. It serves as the medium of the chief executive who cannot make and cannot personally control those contacts that, taken altogether, determine the policy of his company. Several years ago an employment manager of a large plant computed that the total number of contacts made daily between the management and the workers totaled one million. He further estimated that from 90 to 95 per cent of these contacts were made by the foremen. The inevitable conclusion was of course: the foremen's contacts practically are our employment policy. This argument convinced the general manager of the need of "foremanizing."

In civil service the same problem appears. Changes in personnel policy are often stubbornly withstood by the permanent supervisory force. There is something of that respect for and insistence on authority among civil workers that smacks of the military regime. This makes the supervisory force peculiarly jealous of its traditional and, often, petty prerogatives. Then there is a deep-seated loyalty to governmental routine that naturally resists all change. These conditions are cited because they give added emphasis to the need of "foremanizing" and training of executives in the way that has been found so profitable in large private organizations.

Lack of Uniformity of Employment Policy

Thirdly, in large organizations, whether public or private, authority is likely to become decentralized and diverse employment policies may be followed in the different administrative units. Almost unbelievable inconsistencies in salaries, sick leaves and annual leaves, working hours, and other conditions of employment may be found within the same department and particularly as between different departments. This is a most fruitful cause of dissatisfaction among the workers in any given jurisdiction, for it is clear that the employes do not draw departmental lines in making comparison of such fundamental matters of employment. To them the firm or the city or state is the common employer. Justice demands that as such it shall adopt a uniform policy, irrespective of departmental or bureau lines. Uniformity of policy obviously calls for the establishment of a central agency.

Danger of Neglect of Employment Matters

Finally, the extent and complexity of modern organization makes possible neglect and oversight in all sorts of directions. This applies particularly to the work environment. Lighting, ventilation and heat, safety, cleanliness, and sanitary conditions cannot wisely be committed to the janitor and his assistants, much less be expected to take care of themselves. To maintain proper standards and make changes in line with modern improvements requires constant vigilance. It has been found practicable in many concerns to vest general supervision and possibly detailed control of these matters in the employment department.

The public as employer is far from immune in these respects. Our experience with employment conditions in government goes to prove that there is hardly a municipality in which good, reasonable standards are not being violated in at least one department or building under public control. An investigator who completed a survey of some of the buildings in Washington two or three years ago went so far in fact as to state that a first-class factory inspector would not tolerate the conditions under which large numbers of the federal employes were working. Inquiry usually goes to show such a situation is due to the fact that nobody is specifically charged with the duty of periodically checking up working conditions and at the same time authorized to see to it that necessary repairs or improvements are promptly made.

Conclusion

We conclude that both the differences and similarities between public and private employment administration point to the desirability of committing to a definite central agency the responsibility for the well-being of the employes—this to be understood in the broadest sense. The quality of public service is so bound up in the quality of individual service that the state of the latter cannot wisely be left to tradition and rule-of-thumb, as it has been in the past. The pioneer work attempted in industry and trade encourages the movement to establish an independent functionalized department on a par with the other major departments. Certain civil service commissions also are showing that other employment duties than those of examination and certification can be carried on to advantage by a public employment agency. The policies adopted by the civil service commissions in the city of St. Paul, Los Angeles County, and the states of Wisconsin and New Jersey are particularly noteworthy. Standardized salaries and efficiency ratings, as well as follow-up and training policies, are among the planks of their platforms.

The most thoughtful men who have been interested in civil service, either from within or without, are all but unanimous in the belief that future progress in the standards of our public employes lies in the direction of the application of up-to-date personnel administration to government workers. This group includes leading civil service commissioners, secretaries, chief examiners, officials of the National Civil Service Reform League, and the Governmental Research Conference. The annual reports of progressive civil service commissions and of the proceedings of the League give ample testimony to this fact.

CHAPTER VI

A PROPOSED PLAN FOR RECONSTITUTING THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

Introduction

As already indicated in previous chapters of this report, it is the unanimous opinion of the committee that our municipal civil service commissions have not been functioning with any considerable degree of success, and that one of the primary causes of this condition lies in the make-up of the commissions. The committee is therefore venturing to propose a plan for reconstituting these commissions and strengthening public personnel administration in general.

In making this proposal the committee has been guided largely by the standards outlined in the introductory chapter. In other words, its effort has been to devise a plan whereby the administration of the employment function of government would be placed under professional rather than political guidance; whereby merit principles would be faithfully enforced; whereby continuity of employment policy would be maintained; whereby all the employment functions of government would be adequately performed; and whereby more democratic administration of the employment affairs of government would be made possible.

The committee recognizes that the problems of employment, while fundamentally the same in all jurisdictions, do not always require the same treatment in small units of government as they do in the larger units. In a service composed of less than one hundred employes it is not necessary to adopt the machinery and the methods essential for dealing with the employment problems that present themselves in a service of a thousand or more. In the former case the problems are simple and the relation between the workers and the employing authorities may be maintained on a personal basis, whereas in the latter the problems are complex and the personal relationship between the workers and the employing authorities is no longer possible.

In advancing the suggestion that follows, the committee had in mind primarily the larger local governments involving the more complex problems of employment. Just where the line should be drawn to divide the smaller from the larger services is always difficult to determine. Perhaps it is fair, for the purpose in hand,

to distinguish between those jurisdictions having less than 500 employes and those having 500 employes or more. The recommendations of this committee should therefore be considered as applying only to those units of local government having at least 500 employes.

Description of Proposed Plan

After considering a number of different plans, the committee agreed upon a personnel agency to be composed of three members, a civil service commissioner and two associate commissioners.

Method of Appointment

The civil service commissioner, according to this plan, is to be chosen by competitive test conducted by a board of special examiners. This board is to consist of the local superintendent of schools, the probate judge (or the member of the local bench performing the functions of probate judge), and a person selected by these two members who is to be a chief examiner of a civil service commission, or a person who has been engaged for two or more years as employment manager in a private enterprise having a working force of 500 or more.

One of the associate commissioners is to be appointed by the chief executive (the mayor, city manager, or head of the commission in a commission-governed city) from his administrative staff, and the other associate commissioner is to be a representative of the employes in the classified service and elected by them.

Tenure

The commissioner chosen by competitive test is to be chairman of the commission and to hold office during good behavior and efficient service. He is to be subject to removal upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard in his own defense before a board constituted in the same manner as the one by which he was originally examined. The associate commissioner appointed by the chief executive is to hold office for the same term as the chief executive and to be removable at the pleasure of this official. The other associate commissioner is to hold office for a term of three years, but to be subject to recall at any time by the employes in the classified service.

Compensation

The chairman of the commission should receive compensation at least equal to that of the other department heads with

comparable responsibilities. The two associate commissioners, however, should receive no compensation in addition to their regular salaries as administrative officials or employes, for their services on the commission would require only a limited amount of time.

Functions

In the legislative and judicial functions of the commission, such as the formulation of rules and regulations and hearing appeals from employes, all members of that body should have equal authority; but in carrying out the administrative functions, the associate commissioners should have advisory power only, thus giving the chairman of the commission a free hand in the execution of policy.

A draft of the legal provisions to carry this plan into effect will be found in Appendix I.

Advantages of Proposed Plan

Professional Guidance Would Supersede Political Control

In support of this proposal, it may be said that it has the merit of placing the administration of the personnel function of government under professional rather than under political guidance. The civil service commissioner would be selected for his technical and professional qualifications for the work. He would have a free hand in carrying out the purely administrative functions of the personnel agency. Furthermore, since his term of office would be indefinite and his appointment would come from a non-political source, he should feel a reasonable degree of independence in formulating and carrying out his employment policy. In the legislative and judicial functions of the personnel agency, it is true, the two associate commissioners would have an equal voice with the chairman of the commission, but even in these functions it may be expected that the chairman would exercise a preponderating influence and would be the directing power.

Merit Principles Would be More Faithfully Enforced

That merit principles would be more faithfully enforced would appear to be an equally reasonable presumption. Most of the violations of merit principles in the past have been due to the interference of political influences in the work of our civil service

commissions. These influences naturally operate through the politically appointed civil service commissioners themselves. In the plan proposed, however, the chairman of the commission, not receiving his appointment by political methods, would naturally be less amenable to political influences. Furthermore, being a man of professional qualifications and attainments, he would have a professional reputation at stake which he would be unwilling to jeopardize by departing from genuine merit principles and playing into the hands of self-seeking politicians. The employes' representative on the commission may always be expected to stand by merit principles so long as he carries out the desires and wishes of his constituents. For wherever civil service employes have been organized for group action, they have generally supported the merit system. With the chairman of the commission and the member elected by the employes supporting the enforcement of merit principles, occasional opposition from the member appointed by the chief executive will usually fail to be a determining factor.

Greater Continuity of Employment Policy Would be Assured

This plan would also make for continuity of employment policy. As we know, the lack of continuity of employment policy in most civil service jurisdictions has been due to the lack of continuity of tenure on the part of the members of our civil service commissions. It will be recalled from a previous chapter that the average length of service of civil service commissioners has been less than the average term of office for which commissioners have been appointed. Under this proposal, however, we may expect that the chairman of the commission will be retained in office, under normal circumstances, for an indefinite period of time. It is true that there is apt to be a fairly high turnover in the other two places on the commission, but this would not be so fatal to continuity of employment policy as the high turnover in existing commissions. The associate commissioner representing the employes is always likely to stand for about the same general program regardless of who he is, because the great mass of civil service employes will always have about the same desires and interests. In the associate commissionership which will be at the disposal of the chief executive, we may expect to have reflected all the abrupt changes from a pro-merit to a pro-spoils point of view that may take place in the office of mayor itself. A change

in attitude on the part of only one commissioner, however, would not necessarily entail any considerable change in policy on the part of the entire commission.

The Employment Functions of Government Would be More Adequately Performed

Under this plan, moreover, we may expect a more adequate performance of employment functions. The chairman of the commission, with his professional point of view, is sure to see the need of adopting and carrying out a fuller program than that of the average civil service commission of today. Not being restrained by political considerations, he may also be counted upon for more enthusiasm and determination in carrying out his plans. In order to do so, however, he will need the understanding and the confidence of the great body of employes who are intimately concerned with a program of this kind. It will be a great advantage, therefore, that the employes themselves have a representative on the commission through whom the chairman can reach the membership of the service and win their confidence. In like manner the appointee of the chief executive on the commission, while he may often be hostile to new proposals of the chairman for political reasons, could frequently be of great service in educating the chief executive to the significance and the importance of these proposals. At the same time the chairman of the commission would be able to benefit from the advice of his two colleagues, representing as they would the viewpoint of the employes and also of the administrative officials. A commission so constituted, moreover, ought to be able to secure more adequate appropriations for its work than are now secured by our political civil service commissions. It would be more likely to inspire confidence in itself on the part of legislators than the old type of commission, not only because of its non-political character, but also because of the greater zeal and expertness it would display in the work to be performed.

More Democratic Administration of Employment Affairs Would be Assured

Finally, this proposal will make possible more democratic administration of the employment affairs of government. As we have already pointed out, the typical civil service commission of today is representative only of the management but not at all of

the employes. By having one of the members of the commission chosen by the workers, however, both the management and the workers will be represented and greater opportunity for mutual understanding will be introduced into a phase of administration that so vitally concerns the interests and the welfare of the members of the service. Experience goes to show that such representation goes far toward increasing the interest of the employes in their work and developing an *esprit de corps* throughout the working force.

A Few Objections Considered

It is expected, of course, that the proposed plan will meet with criticism. The committee itself realizes that perfection has not been attained and will gladly receive constructive suggestions. At this time it wishes merely to anticipate a few objections that are likely to be made and that the committee itself has given some consideration.

Decentralization of Executive Responsibility

It may be urged that the plan proposed decentralizes executive responsibility. Those who would make this objection doubtless would point to the confusion and irresponsibility which have resulted from the existence of numerous independent boards and commissions in our state and local governments throughout the country. They would argue that the tendency of the times is away from this form of decentralization and toward greater concentration of authority in the hands of the chief executive, and that the proposed plan runs counter to this tendency.

The committee has no quarrel with the general proposition that responsibility for the administration of the various functions of government ought to be centralized in the chief executive wherever feasible. It feels, however, that like most principles of government the theory of centralized executive control has its limitations and cannot be applied to all situations indiscriminately. Due regard must be had to the peculiar circumstances surrounding each case of proposed application of the principle in question.

In determining whether or not it would be feasible at this time to place the employment function of government completely under the control of the chief executive, we must not lose sight of the fact that the spoils motive is still operating powerfully in American government, especially in our cities. So long as this

is the case it would appear wiser to postpone yet for a while giving full control to the political head of the government over a function which it is generally agreed should be administered without regard to political considerations. Only when the spoils motive has been weakened to the point of impotency will it be safe to centralize all power over employment matters in the hands of an elected chief executive.

Our task, in the meantime, is to undermine and destroy the spoils motive as rapidly as possible. One way of destroying it is to remove the thing it feeds upon, namely, patronage. By placing the enforcement of the merit system beyond the control of the political chief executive, the use of public offices for patronage purposes is made more difficult and to that extent the spoils motive is weakened. Certainly the opposite procedure of giving the chief executive greater control over appointments, promotions, and removals than he now has would be like jumping from the frying pan into the fire, for it would merely increase the political manipulation from which civil service administration has suffered too much in the past.

Feasibility of Competitive Test in Choosing Commissioner

No doubt the question will be raised whether a competitive test is suitable for the selection of a civil service commissioner. Since high grade professional positions have been filled successfully by competitive test in many jurisdictions, the committee feels justified in assuming that the civil service commissionership can also be filled in this manner. Perhaps the membership of the board of special examiners provided for in the proposed plan might be improved upon, and suggestions to that end will be welcomed. But to the assertion that the right type of man can not be chosen by competitive test the committee does not subscribe.

As to Representation of the Public

Still another objection that may be anticipated is that the general public will not be adequately represented on the commission. In considering this objection we should bear in mind that one of the three members of the commission will be appointed by the elected chief executive and will hold office at the latter's pleasure. This arrangement ought to give sufficient assurance that the public's point of view, as reflected through the chief executive, will be kept before the commission. However, if the viewpoint of

the public on any vital issue should nevertheless be disregarded by the commission, there still remains the power of the chief executive and the legislative body to veto the action of the commission by the simple expedient of withholding appropriations.

Need of Larger Appropriations

In view of the fact that so few commissions are now able to perform all of the functions definitely assigned or implied by law, and as the reasonable requirements of a personnel agency involve additional activities, the need for more generous appropriations is obvious. Adequate financial support is therefore a *sine qua non* of the success of personnel administration. This feature of the program, though given less consideration here, is of almost equal importance with the plan proposed above for reconstituting the commission.

Conclusion

The above recommendations grow out of the conviction that the employment conditions under which upwards of two million men and women are working call for more thorough-going attention than they now receive. Existing civil service commissions with their predisposition to act along political rather than professional lines do not appear to be adapted to the new role which the personnel agency of government will be called upon to play if adequate attention is to be given to these employment conditions. For this reason it is proposed to substitute for the typical commission of today an agency whose make-up emphasizes the professional rather than the political approach to its task and at the same time insures coöperative relationships with the two groups directly concerned with employment matters, the management and the employes. It is the belief of the committee that an agency so constituted, if given the necessary financial support, will prove much more effective in dealing with present day problems in the public service than the type of civil service commissions we now have.

APPENDIX I

SUGGESTED LEGAL PROVISIONS FOR CARRYING OUT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE

Section 1. There is hereby created a civil service commission consisting of three members, one to be known as the civil service commissioner, and the others to be known as associate civil service commissioners. The civil service commissioner shall be appointed by the mayor after a competitive examination as hereinafter provided and shall hold office as a member of the classified service; one of the associate civil service commissioners shall be elected by the employes in the classified service from their own number for a term of three years; and the other associate civil service commissioner shall be appointed by the mayor from among the administrative officials of the city government without competitive examination and shall hold office during the term of office of the mayor, or until removed as associate civil service commissioner at the pleasure of the mayor and the appointment of a successor.

Section 2. The civil service commissioner shall be a citizen of the United States and shall have (a) at least five years' experience in organizing and conducting the work of a civil service commission; or (b) at least five years' experience in an administrative capacity in an employment department of a private or public establishment employing at least 500 persons; and (c) such additional qualifications as may be required by the board of special examiners hereinafter provided for.

Section 3. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of civil service commissioner and there is no eligible list prepared as provided in this section, from which appointment can be made, the mayor shall forthwith appoint a board of special examiners to conduct an examination under the provisions of this act for the purpose of preparing a list of names, in the order of their relative excellence, of persons eligible to appointment to the office of civil service commissioner. As members of the board of special examiners, the mayor shall appoint (a) the superintendent of schools; (b) the judge of the probate court; and (c) a third person chosen by these two who has served within the United States continuously for two or more years as a chief examiner of a civil service commission or who has been engaged continuously within the United States for two or more years in selecting trained

employes for positions involving professional or technical skill. The members of this board of special examiners shall serve until an eligible list has been established and appointment made therefrom. Two members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business. Within ten days after its members have been appointed, this board shall proceed to advertise and hold an examination under the provisions of this act. The method of examination and the manner of preparing a resulting eligible list and certifying to the mayor therefrom, by the board of special examiners, and making appointment shall be the same as prescribed for other examinations, certifications, and appointments under this act; and the board of special examiners shall have the same powers and obligations in respect thereto as those vested in or imposed upon the civil service commission. Whenever a vacancy exists in the office of civil service commissioner in the classified service, the mayor shall forthwith appoint the person standing highest upon the list of eligibles for appointment to this office.

Section 4. Within thirty days after the approval of this act the mayor shall publish in at least two newspapers of general circulation in (name of city) and cause to be posted in the various departments and offices of the city government an announcement of the place and time for the holding of an organization meeting of the employes who have been in the classified service of the city for at least three months, the time of the meeting to be not earlier than five days nor later than ten days after the announcement. At this organization meeting such employes shall proceed to devise a permanent organization and frame rules and regulations for the election of a person to represent them as an associate civil service commissioner. In case a vacancy occurs in the office of the associate civil service commissioner who represents the employes in the classified service, such vacancy shall be filled by the election of another member of the commission under the rules and regulations adopted by the employes in the classified service governing such election. Under rules and regulations adopted by them the employes in the classified service may at any time recall the associate civil service commissioner representing them and elect his successor.

Section 5. The civil service commissioner may not be removed from office except for cause, which shall be stated by the mayor in writing, and after an opportunity to be heard in his

own defense before a trial board constituted in the same manner as the board of special examiners provided for in Section 3 of this act. The decision of this trial board, after hearing the charges preferred by the mayor and the defense presented by the civil service commissioner, shall be final.

Section 6. Subject to the provisions of this act the civil service commissioner shall have sole power to make appointments, promotions, transfers, reinstatements, reductions, and removals of employes of the civil service commission. He shall be the executive head of the civil service commission. In all matters, however, coming before the civil service commission as a body the civil service commissioner and each of the two associate civil service commissioners shall have an equal vote.

Section 7. The civil service commissioner shall receive a salary of $ annually. Each of the two associate civil service commissioners shall render their services as members of the commission without compensation. The civil service commissioner shall employ a chief examiner who shall act also as secretary, and such other employes as the commission deems necessary. The employes of the civil service commission, including the chief examiner, shall be in the classified service as hereinafter defined. The city shall pay the salary of the civil service commissioner and the salaries of the employes of the commission, and defray all other necessary expenses incurred by the commission in carrying out the purposes of this act, but the commission shall not incur expense in excess of its appropriation. The proper officials of the city shall provide the commission with suitable quarters and accommodations for carrying on its work, permit the use of public buildings for examinations and other official purposes, and otherwise assist without compensation in carrying out the purposes of this act.

APPENDIX II

SUMMARY OF REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE NO. I.[1]

1. By What Legal Authority is the Commission Created?

By state law — 8 commissions:

Albany, Buffalo, Kansas City, Kan., Milwaukee, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse.

By home rule charter — 14 commissions:

Baltimore, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Haven, St. Paul, San Francisco, Toledo.

By state law and home rule charter — 2 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati.

2. Does the Civil Service Commission Have Supervision Over Other Commissions?

No — 24 commissions (all of them).

3. Is the Civil Service Commission Subject to the Supervision of Another Commission?

Yes (subject to control of state commission) — 9 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, New York City, Rochester, Syracuse.

No — 15 commissions:

Baltimore, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, Philadelphia, St. Paul, San Francisco, Toledo.

4. How Many Members Has the Commission?

One member — 1 commission:

St. Paul — The comptroller elected every two years becomes ex officio the civil service commissioner.

Three members — 20 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

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[1] On account of the vagueness or the incompleteness of the replies, a number of questions that appeared in the questionnaire have been omitted from this summary.

Four members — 1 commission:
Detroit.

Five members — 2 commissions:
Los Angeles, Milwaukee.

5. By Whom are the Civil Service Commissioners Appointed?

Chief Administrator — 1 commission:
Akron.

Mayor — 17 commissions:
Albany, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

City Council — 2 commissions:
Denver, Philadelphia.

City Council or Commission (under commission form of government) — 2 commissions:
Buffalo, Kansas City, Kan.

City Council or Commission (under commission-manager form of government) — 1 commission:
Dayton.

The comptroller elected every two years becomes ex officio civil service commissioner:
St. Paul.

6. If the Civil Service Commission is Appointed by the Chief Executive, is Legislative Confirmation Required?

Yes (by city council) — 7 commissions:
Baltimore, Columbus, Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Toledo (but requirement has never been met).

No — 10 commissions:
Akron, Albany, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Mo., New York City, Rochester, San Francisco, Syracuse.

7. For What Term are Commissioners Appointed?

No stated term of office — 1 commission:
New York City.

Pleasure of mayor — 1 commission:
Rochester.

Six years — 9 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, New Haven, San Francisco, Toledo.

Five years — 1 commission:

Milwaukee.

Four years — 5 commissions:

Buffalo, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Philadelphia.

Three years — 3 commissions:

Baltimore, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis.

Two years — 4 commissions:

Albany, Houston, Syracuse, St. Paul (1 ex officio commissioner).

8. Are Commissioners Appointed for Overlapping Terms?

Yes — 17 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, San Francisco, Toledo.

No — 6 commissions:

Albany, Buffalo, Houston, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse.

Comptroller ex officio civil service commissioner:

St. Paul.

9. In What Manner do Terms Overlap?

One appointed every two years for a term of six years — 9 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, San Francisco, Toledo, New Haven.

One appointed each year for a three-year term — 3 commissions:

Baltimore, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis.

One appointed each year for a four-year term — 2 commissions:

Detroit, Kansas City, Kan.

One appointed each year for a term of five years — 1 commission:

Milwaukee.

One appointed each year for three years and two every fourth year; all serve for four years — 1 commission:

Los Angeles.

(Method of overlapping not given — 1 commission: New York City.)

10. Does the Term of Office of the Commissioners Coincide with that of the Official or Body by Whom the Commissioners are Appointed?

Yes — 6 commissions:

Albany, Houston, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse.

No — 16 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo. (Commission has resigned with change of administration), Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, San Francisco, Toledo.

The comptroller ex officio civil service commissioner — St. Paul.

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Denver.

11. Are the Commissioners Removable Before the Expiration of Their Term of Office?

Yes — 20 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

No — 3 commissions:

Baltimore, Columbus, Milwaukee.

Comptroller ex officio civil service commissioner:

St. Paul.

12. By Whom May They be Removed?

By the mayor — 7 commissions:

Cincinnati, Cleveland, Detroit, Kansas City, Mo., New Haven, Syracuse, Toledo.

By mayor or state civil service commission — 3 commissions:

Albany, New York City, Rochester.

By mayor and city council — 2 commissions:
Houston, Los Angeles.

By city council — 4 commissions:
Denver, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, (by board of supervisors).

By council or commission (under commission form of government) — 2 commissions:
Buffalo, Kansas City, Kan.

By council or commission (under commission-manager form of government) — 1 commission:
Dayton.

By city manager — 1 commission:
Akron (by "chief administrator").

13. Which, if Any, of the Following Restrictions are Placed Upon the Choice of Civil Service Commissioners?

(a) That not all commissioners may belong to the same political party?

Yes — 13 commissions:
Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Milwaukee, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, Syracuse.

No — 11 commissions:
Akron, Cleveland, Dayton, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, St. Paul, San Francisco, Toledo.

(b) That they may not hold any other government office of profit?

Yes — 14 commissions:
Akron (nor be a candidate for office), Albany, Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit (may be notaries public), Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo.. Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Syracuse.

No — 10 commissions:
Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Dayton, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Rochester, St. Paul, Toledo.

(c) That they must have reached a certain age?

Yes — 2 commissions:
Houston (25 years), Toledo (21 years).

No — 22 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse.

(d) That they must belong to certain professions?

No — 24 commissions (all of them).

(e) That they must have had certain training and experience?

No — 24 commissions (all of them).

(f) That they must be residents of the community to which the law applies?

Yes — 17 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Cincinnati, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston (3 years), Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo. (5 years), Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City (resident of state), Rochester, San Francisco (for one year preceding), Syracuse, Toledo.

No — 7 commissions:

Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Denver, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, St. Paul.

14. State Any Other Legal Restrictions There May be in the Law Applying in Your Jurisdiction.

Yes — 7 commissions:

Dayton (must be legal elector), Denver (commissioners must be "persons of known devotion to civil service reform"), Houston (one member must be a city councilman), Kansas City, Mo. (must be known to be devoted to the improvement of civil service), Minneapolis (must be persons who favor merit and efficiency in the public service), New York City (must not leave state), San Francisco (required to take oath that they are "opposed to appointments to the civil service as a reward for political activity . . .").

None — 17 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Haven, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, Syracuse, Toledo.

15. What is the Rate of Compensation Paid to Each of the Members of the Commission?

Akron	$ 300 per annum	Milwaukee	$ 480 per annum
Buffalo	2580 " "	Minneapolis	1000 " "
Cincinnati	1500 " "	New York City	5000 " " for commissioners 6000 per annum for president
Cleveland	2000 " "		
Columbus	1000 " " (Secretary—a member ... 2280 per annum)	Philadelphia	5000 per annum
Dayton	250 " "	Rochester	1000 " "
Detroit	2000 " " for commissioners 2500 per annum for president	San Francisco	1200 " "
		Syracuse	600 " " for president 500 per annum for commissioners
Kansas City, Kan. (Not to exceed $5 per meeting or $500 per annum.)		Toledo	900 per annum

No compensation — 8 commissions:

Abany (member acting as secretary receives $1000 per year), Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, New Haven, St. Paul (no compensation as civil service commissioner).

16. Does the Commission Have Power to Levy Its Own Taxes?

No — 24 commissions (all of them).

17. Does the Commission Have Power to Make Appropriations Which Are Mandatory on the City Council?

Yes — 2 commissions:

Milwaukee (.017 of a mill), Minneapolis (not less than $25 per every 1000 inhabitants).

No — 22 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

18. Does the Commission Have the Power to Determine the Number of Its Own Employes?

Yes — 12 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore (subject to appropriation), Cleveland (within limit of appropriation), Columbus (within limits of money appropriated by Council), Dayton, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York City (within limit of appropriation).

No — 12 commissions:

Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Detroit (subject to approval of common council), Los Angeles (city council does), New Haven, Philadelphia, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo, Rochester.

19. Does the Commission Have Power to Fix the Salaries of All Its Own Employes? If It Has Power to Fix the Salaries of Some, But Not of Others, State Which Salaries It Has Power to Fix.

Yes — 10 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore (if it can get the appropriation), Cleveland, Columbus, Denver, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Milwaukee (all except chief examiner and commissioner whose salaries are subject to approval of council), Minneapolis, New York City.

No — 14 commissions:

Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Dayton (recommends to city commission who decide), Detroit (subject to approval of common council), Houston (subject to approval of common council), Los Angeles, New Haven (fixed by charter), Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

20. Are the Salaries of the Commissioners Fixed in the Law?

Yes — 5 commissions:

Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Minneapolis, San Francisco.

No — 12 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Milwaukee, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse, Toledo.

No salary — 7 commissions:

Baltimore, Denver, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, New Haven, St. Paul.

21. Are the Salaries of Any of the Employes of the Commission Fixed in the Law?

Yes — 5 commissions:

Baltimore (salary of chief examiner and secretary not to exceed $4000 — The commission may appoint a secretary, salary not to exceed $1800 per year and an examiner for temporary service at $5 per day), Denver (salary of secretary not to

exceed $1800 a year — salary of examiner for temporary service not exceeding $5 a day), Kansas City, Kan., New Haven (secretary), San Francisco.

No — 19 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, Syracuse, Toledo.

22. What Body Fixes the Salaries not Fixed by Law?

City council — 11 commissions:

Akron, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Columbus, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Philadelphia, St. Paul, Toledo.

Board of estimate and apportionment — 3 commissions:

Albany, Rochester, Syracuse.

Civil service commission, subject to getting appropriation — 1 commission:

Baltimore.

Board of control — 1 commission:

Cleveland.

City commissioners — 1 commission:

Dayton.

Civil service commission — 2 commissions:

Milwaukee, Minneapolis.

Board of aldermen — 1 commission:

New York City.

Board of supervisors — 1 commission:

San Francisco.

Not reporting — 3 commissions:

New Haven, Denver, Kansas City, Kan.

23. Has the Commission the Sole Power to Make Rules?

Yes — 14 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Haven, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Toledo.

No — 7 commissions:

Albany (mayor and state civil service commission), Buffalo (subject to approval of mayor and state

commission), Dayton (must be approved by city commission), Houston (must be approved by council), New York City (subject to approval of state commission), Rochester (approval of mayor and state civil service commission required), Syracuse (mayor and state civil service commission).

Must be approved by mayor in 10 days, otherwise approval is not necessary — 1 commission:

Milwaukee.

Has power to frame rules for councils' action — 1 commission:

St. Paul.

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Columbus.

24. Has the Commission Power to Exempt Positions?

Yes — 17 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Houston, Los Angeles, New Haven, Kansas City, Mo., Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse.

No — 7 commissions:

Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., St. Paul, San Francisco, Toledo.

25. Is a Public Hearing Required Before a Change in Rules can be Made?

Yes — 5 commissions:

Cincinnati (but it is a dead letter), Milwaukee (not by law, but by the rules), New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia.

No — 19 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore (matter is being considered and rules may have been changed recently), Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan. (rule must be published before it takes effect), Kansas City, Mo. (all changes in rules shall be published), Los Angeles, Minneapolis (notice of change in rules must be published), Rochester (rules must be published), St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

26. Has the Commission the Power to Sit as a Trial Board or to Name a Trial Board in Its Stead in Cases of Discipline and Dismissal?

Yes — 14 commissions:

Baltimore (by extreme stretching of charter provision it has successfully claimed jurisdiction), Cleveland (for police, firemen, sanitary police, and classified positions in board of education), Columbus, Dayton (sit as trial board), Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles (except police, firemen, and library), Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Philadelphia (for uniformed police and firemen only), San Francisco (acts as an appeal board), Toledo (police and fire departments only).

No — 10 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Denver, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, St. Paul, Syracuse.

27. Is the Decision of the Trial Board Mandatory Upon the Appointing Officer?

Yes — 13 commissions:

Baltimore (so far, its jurisdiction has not been questioned seriously), Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Toledo.

No — 1 commission:

Kansas City, Mo.

28. Has the Commission Power to Investigate the Operation of the Civil Service Law?

Yes — 20 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

No — 1 commission:

Philadelphia.
Cincinnati (probably).
Kansas City, Kan. (not specified).

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Denver.

29. Has the Commission Power to Investigate the Organization and Efficiency of Departments and to Recommend Changes?

Yes — 11 commissions:

Akron, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, St. Paul (but has no power to enforce changes), Toledo (of a personnel only), Cincinnati (probably, but never does).

No — 12 commissions:

Albany, Buffalo, Denver, Kansas City, Kan. (not specified), Kansas City, Mo. (not by charter), Los Angeles (power to investigate only), New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester (not stated, is not done), San Francisco, Syracuse.

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Baltimore.

30. Has the Commission the Power to Classify Positions According to Duties? If So, Has It this Power Expressly or by Implication?

Yes, expressly — 15 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, New York City, Philadelphia, San Francisco, Toledo, Los Angeles.

Yes, by implication — 3 commissions:

Buffalo, Kansas City, Kan. (doubtful), Rochester (power considered doubtful).

Yes — 4 commissions:

Detroit, Milwaukee, New Haven, St. Paul.

No — 1 commission:

Syracuse.

31. Has the Commission Power to Recommend Proper Rates of Pay for Employes in the Various Departments?

Yes — 11 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati (but it would be in vain), Cleveland, Columbus (but recommendations would be ineffective), Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas

City, Kan. (but does not), Philadelphia, San Francisco, Toledo (has power, but never uses it).

No — 12 commissions:

Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, St. Paul, Syracuse.

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Denver.

32. Has the Commission the Explicit Power in the Law to Check Payrolls Prior to the Payment of Employes?

Yes — 20 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore (made mandatory), Buffalo, Cincinnati (but doubts if it could be done), Cleveland, Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles (cooperates with the city auditor), Milwaukee, New York City, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

No — 4 commissions:

Kansas City, Kan., Minneapolis (power is implied), New Haven, Philadelphia.

33. As a Matter of Custom, Is There Likely to be a Change in the Personnel of the Civil Service Commission with Change of Local Administration?

Yes — 10 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Cincinnati (if there is a political change in the administration), Cleveland (Mayor can "get" one man each time he serves), Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis (each mayor appoints one or two), New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, Syracuse (partial change — one old member reappointed).

No — 11 commissions:

Baltimore, Columbus, Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Haven, San Francisco, Toledo (because of long term of office).

Not reporting — 3 commissions:

Buffalo, Denver, St. Paul.

34. Does the Civil Service Commission Have Standing With the Public?

(a) As an impartial agency?

Yes — 14 commissions:

Albany, Baltimore (high), Buffalo, Cleveland (only in a moderate degree), Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Haven, San Francisco, Syracuse, Toledo.

No — 5 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, Rochester.

Indefinite — 2 commissions:

New York City (perhaps), Philadelphia (fair).

Not reporting — 3 commissions:

Columbus, Denver, St. Paul.

(b) As one engaged in promoting efficiency in the service?

Yes — 12 commissions:

Albany, Baltimore (high), Buffalo, Cleveland (only in a moderate degree), Dayton, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New Haven, San Francisco, Syracuse.

No — 8 commissions:

Akron, Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Mo., Minneapolis, New York City, Rochester, Toledo.

Indefinite — 1 commission:

Philadelphia.

Not reporting — 3 commissions:

Columbus, Denver, St. Paul.

35. Are Positions Classified According to Duties?

Yes — 17 commissions:

Albany (supposed to be), Baltimore, Buffalo, Cleveland, Dayton, Denver, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis (fairly so), New Haven, New York City, San Francisco, Syracuse.

No — 4 commissions:

Cincinnati, Philadelphia, Rochester (in part only), Toledo (not yet — work is under way).

Not reporting — 3 commissions:

Akron, Columbus, St. Paul.

36. Is Classification Kept Current by Civil Service Commission? If Not, by What Agency?

Yes — 11 commissions:

Albany, Baltimore, Dayton, Denver, Houston, Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis (but it is interfered with by action of council), Rochester, San Francisco, Toledo.

No — 11 commissions:

Akron, Buffalo (by city council and clerk), Cincinnati, Cleveland (not sufficient funds), Detroit, Kansas City, Kan. (by ordinance only), Kansas City, Mo., New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Syracuse.

Not reporting — 2 commissions:

Columbus, St. Paul.

37. Has an Equitable Salary Scale Been Set Up on Basis of Classification?

Yes — 10 commissions:

Akron (1917), Buffalo, Cleveland (1916, still fairly equitable), Dayton, Detroit, Houston, Kansas City, Kan. (somewhat), Kansas City, Mo., Milwaukee, San Francisco (grades — within classes).

No — 11 commissions:

Albany, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Denver (salary scale voted by people), Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia (one has been recommended, but has not been adopted as yet), Rochester (quite the reverse), Syracuse, Toledo, Los Angeles (not altogether).

Not reporting — 2 commissions:

Columbus, St. Paul.

38. Does the Civil Service Commission Recommend Changes, or is It in Any Way Responsible for Changes in Salary Scale?

Yes — 6 commissions:

Cleveland (recommends changes to board of control), Dayton (recommends to city commissioner), Detroit, Houston, Philadelphia (it is its legal duty, but only the initial plan has been recommended), San Francisco (established base rates).

No — 16 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Buffalo, Cincinnati, Columbus, Denver, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Minneapolis, New Haven, New York City, Rochester, Syracuse, Toledo.

Recently requested to do so by council — 1 commission:

Milwaukee.

Not reporting — 1 commission:

St. Paul.

39. Are Efficiency Ratings an Important Factor in Determining Promotions?

Yes — 8 commissions:

Albany (for police and firemen), Cleveland (only for promotions, not elaborate), Columbus, Dayton, Denver, Houston (police and fire departments only), New Haven (police and fire departments only), Syracuse (to some extent).

No — 16 commissions:

Akron, Baltimore (not yet — system being worked out for fire), Buffalo (none in force), Cincinnati, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo., Los Angeles, Milwaukee (given weight of 20 per cent), Minneapolis (law calls for them but has not been obeyed), New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Toledo (not used at all).

40. Are Efficiency Ratings an Important Factor in Determining Salary Increments Within a Grade?

Yes — 3 commissions:

Cleveland (only to small extent), Dayton, Houston (in fire and police departments).

No — 20 commissions:

Akron, Albany, Baltimore, Cincinnati, Columbus, Denver, Detroit, Kansas City, Kan., Kansas City, Mo. (no salary increments within grades), Los Angeles, Milwaukee, Minneapolis (law calls for them but has not been obeyed), New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Rochester, St. Paul, San Francisco, Syracuse. Toledo (not yet — but it is required by charter).

Not reporting — 1 commission:

Buffalo.

41. Describe Briefly the Functions of the Civil Service Commission with Regard to Efficiency Ratings. Does the Commission

Jurisdictions.	Check the Ratings?	Supervise the Ratings?	Record the Ratings?	Seek to Standardize the Ratings?	Serve as an Appeal Agency?
Akron	no	no	no	no	no
Albany	No records kept except for police and firemen.				
Baltimore	nothing as yet	no	no	no	no
Cincinnati	no	no	no	no	no
Cleveland	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Columbus	-	-	-	-	-
Dayton	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Denver	no	no	yes	no	yes
Detroit	-	-	-	-	-
Houston	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Kansas City, Kan.	no	no	no	no	no
Kansas City, Mo.	—	—	yes	—	—
Los Angeles	—	—	—	—	no
Milwaukee	no	(but may create position of civil service examiner.)			
Minneapolis	no	no	no	no	no
New Haven	no	—	—	—	—
New York City	Has right do do so — ratings are perfunctory.				
Philadelphia	no	no	no	no	—
Rochester	no	no	no	no	no
Syracuse	no	no	no	no	no
Toledo	All are required; but none is done.				

APPENDIX III

SUMMARY OF REPLIES TO QUESTIONNAIRE NO. 2.[1]

Size and Classification of Service

Jurisdictions	Total		ENTIRE SERVICE											
			Not subject to civil service regulations				Subject to civil service regulations							
			Unclassified Service		Exempt Class		Total		Competitive Class		Non-Competitive Class		Labor Class	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
State Governments:														
New York	32572	100	1936	6	1349	4.1	29287	89.9	11274	34.6	8013	24.6	10000	30.7
California	8002[2]	100	——	—	591	7.4	7411	92.6	6161	77	——	——	1250[3]	15.6
New Jersey	19113	100	969	5.1	352	1.8	17792	93.1	11309	59.2	2908	15.2	3575	18.7
Wisconsin	5100	100	1900	37.3	650	12.7	2550	50	1550	30.4	425	8.3	575	11.3
Maryland	2892	100	*1356*[4]	46.9	*1356*	46.9	1536	53.1	1536	53.1	——	——	none	——
County Governments:														
Essex County	1151	100	17	1.5	36	3.1	1098	95.4	482	41.9	495	43	121	10.5
Los Angeles County	4075	100	81	2	——	—	3994	98	2335	57.3	332	8.1	1327	32.6
City Governments—population over 250,000:														
New York	57648	100	232	.4	705	1.2	56711	98.3	33752	58.6	6752	11.7	16207	28.1
Philadelphia	17649	100	12	.1	1925	10.9	15712	89	9741	55.2	——	——	5971	33.8
Los Angeles	6952	100	*876*	12.6	*876*	12.6	6076	87.4	3961	57	——	——	2115	30.4
Buffalo	9323	100	3681	39.5	47	.5	5595	60	2988	32	1050	11.3	1557	16.7
Newark	4847	100	151	3.1	16	.3	4680	96.6	3310	68.3	311	6.4	1059	21.9
Seattle	6012	100	158	2.6	——	—	5854	97.4	5104	84.9	——	——	750	12.5

[1] On account of the vagueness or the incompleteness of the replies, and also because of limitations of space, a number of questions that appeared in the questionnaire have been omitted.

[2] Total does not include unclassified service.

[3] This is an average. The commission reported 1000-1500.

[4] A few commissions reported the same number of employes for more than one class. Wherever this was obviously a duplication, the figures are given in italics, as in this case.

Size and Classification of Service (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Total		ENTIRE SERVICE											
			Not subject to civil service regulations				Subject to civil service regulations							
			Unclassified Service		Exempt Class		Total		Competitive Class		Non-Competitive Class		Labor Class	
	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent	Number	Per Cent
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:														
Dayton	973	100	*34*	3.5	*34*	3.5	939	96.5	616	63.3	23	2.4	300	30.8
Paterson	865	100	45	5.2	10	1.2	810	93.6	534	61.7	41	4.7	235	27.2
Yonkers	1630	100	486	29.8	32	2	1112	68.2	688	42.2	2	.1	422	25.9
City Governments—population under 100,000:														
Tacoma	1185	100	*433*	36.5	*433*	36.5	752	63.5	564	47.6	——	——	188	15.9
San Diego	1020	100	*27*	2.7	*33*	3.2	960	94.1	437	42.9	*33*	3.2	490	48
Ithaca	234	100	123	52.6	9	3.8	102	43.6	49	20.9	3	1.3	50	21.4
Ogdensburg	236	100	149	63.1	4	1.7	83	35.3	32	13.6	1	.4	50	21.2
Little Falls	151	100	81	53.6	21	14	49	32.4	20	13.2	4	2.6	25	16.6
Fremont	50	100	——	——	—	——	50	100	25	50	16	32	9	18

Probationary Period

Jurisdictions	Length of Period	Do probationers receive systematic instruction during the probationary period	Does civil service commission receive periodic reports on work of probationers	Number of employes whose probationary period expired during 1921	Of this number, how many were dropped during or at end of this period
State Governments:					
New York	3 mos.	No	No	No record	A very small number
Illinois	90 days	No	No	No record	
Massachusetts	6 mos.	No	No	No data	
California	6 mos.	No	No	1266	21
New Jersey	3 mos.	No	No	6599	Not over 5 per cent
Wisconsin	1 to 3 mos.[1]	No	No	No data	None
Maryland	90 days	No	No	304	10
County Governments:					
Los Angeles County	2 to 6 mos.[2]	——	Yes	432	——
Essex County	3 mos.	No	No	No data	
City Governments—population over 250,000:					
New York	1 to 6 mos.[3]	Yes	Yes	——	——
Philadelphia	3 mos.	No	No	600	100
Detroit	3 mos.	——[4]	No	1004 in 6 mos.	25
Los Angeles	6 mos.	Only in police and fire depts.	No	——	——
Buffalo	6 mos.	——	No	——	None
Milwaukee	6 mos.	No	No	——	1
Newark	3 mos.	No	No	——	——
Seattle	3 mos.	No	No	1000	54
Portland	6 mos.[5]	No	No	——	——

[1] One, two or three months in discretion of appointing officer.

[2] Department head has option of dropping probationers within this period.

[3] Labor class, one month; policemen and firemen, 6 months; miscellaneous positions, three months.

[4] Head of dept. takes care of instructions to probationers.

[5] For firemen it is 9 months.

Probationary Period (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Length of Period	Do probationers receive systematic instruction during the probationary period	Does civil service commission receive periodic reports on work of probationers	Number of employes whose probationary period expired during 1921	Of this number, how many were dropped during or at end of this period
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:					
St. Paul	——[1]	No	No	600	10
Dayton	6 mos.	No	Only monthly efficiency ratings	142	None
Paterson	3 mos.	No	No	No data	
Yonkers	3 mos.	Yes (school for police)	No	——	None
City Governments—population under 100,000:					
Tacoma	6 mos.	No	No	104	None
San Diego	6 mos.	No	No	——	——
San Jose	6 mos.	——[2]	——[3]	——	——
Ithaca	2 mos.	Yes	No	4	None
Ogdensburg	3 mos.	No	No	——	——
Little Falls	3 mos.	No	No	6	None
Fremont	3 mos.	Yes	Yes	——	——
Conneaut	30 days	Yes	——	——	——

[1] For original appointments, 6 months; for promotion, 2 months.

[2] Fire and Police departments, not systematic in other departments.

[3] A monthly efficiency report on all members of police and fire departments.

Efficiency Ratings

How often are ratings made per year?

Twelve times annually—2 commissions:
Dayton, San Jose (police and fire departments only).

Six times annually—2 commissions:
Los Angeles County, San Diego.

Four times annually—5 commissions:
New Jersey, Essex County, Newark, Seattle, Paterson.

Three times annually—3 commissions:
New York, New York City, Tacoma.

Two times annually—1 commission:
Conneaut.

At time of examination—3 commissions:
Milwaukee, Yonkers, Fremont.

None made—9 commissions:
California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Buffalo, Detroit, Los Angeles, Philadelphia, St. Paul, Ogdensburg.

Not reporting—4 commissions:
Maryland, Portland, Ithaca, Little Falls.

Promotions

Jurisdictions	Number of promotion examinations given in 1921	Number of persons taking examinations who passed	Number of those who passed who were promoted	Number of real [1] promotions made altogether
State Governments:				
New York	167	972	260	——
Illinois	None	——	——	——
California	9 (1920)	66 (1920)	45 (1920)	——
New Jersey	54	488	129	100
Maryland	3	12	12	12
County Governments:				
Los Angeles Co.	23	308	80	80
Essex County	3	8	——	——
City Governments—population over 250,000:				
New York	337	——	——	——
Philadelphia	23	400	138	138
Detroit	——[2]	——	——	133
Milwaukee	20	52	35	——
Newark	9	247	Not available	
Seattle	35	183	53	70
Portland	5	49	15	15
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:				
St. Paul	31	120	——	——
Dayton	1	20	1	2
Paterson	4	47	Not available	
Yonkers	5	——	18	19
City Governments—population under 100,000:				
Tacoma	8	59	7	11
San Diego	4	22	8	8
San Jose	3	5	5	5
Fremont	None	——	——	——
Conneaut	4	4	2	2

[1] By real promotion is meant advancement from a lower to a higher grade position, not merely an increase in compensation.

[2] Charter does not provide for promotional examinations.

Leaves of Absence

Jurisdictions	Annual leave allowed		Sick leave allowed		Total number of days lost with pay on account of sick leave in service in 1921	Is doctor's certificate required for sick leave beyond first few days	If so, after how many days
	With pay	Without pay	With pay	Without pay			
State Governments:							
New York	No rule		No rule		——	No	——
Illinois	15 days	1 year	15 days	Indef.	——	No	——
Massachusetts	No rule		No rule		No data	No rule	
California	15 working days	30 days	15 days	60 days half-pay	——	Yes	5 days
New Jersey	2 weeks	No limit	2 weeks	No limit	——	——	——
Wisconsin	3 weeks	1 year	No standards		——	——	——
Maryland	2 weeks	——	16 days	——	——	No	——
County Governments:							
Los Angeles County	2 weeks	Varies	2 weeks 75%, 6 weeks 50%	Varies	8703	Yes usually	——
Essex County	2 weeks	No standards			Not available	No standards	
City Governments—population over 250,000:							
New York	——	——	——	——	——	Yes	12 days
Philadelphia	14 days	——	1 mo.	Discretionary	—	No	——
Detroit	——	——	——	——	——	Yes	——
	(Leave of absence ordinance pending)						
Los Angeles	2 weeks	——	——[1]	No limit	——	Yes	Entire period
Buffalo	2 weeks	1 year	Optional with city commission	——	——	——	——
Milwaukee	2 weeks	1 year	None	Indef.	Not known	No	——
Newark	2 weeks	——	——	——	Not available	No	——
Seattle	15 days	——	None	——	——	——	——
Portland	15 days	2 years	None	Reasonable length of time	——	——	——

[1] 75% of pay 1st 2 weeks, 50% next 4 weeks. None thereafter.

Leaves of Absence (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Annual leave allowed		Sick leave allowed		Total number of days lost with pay on account of sick leave in service in 1921	Is doctor's certificate required for sick leave beyond first few days	If so, after how many days
	With pay	Without pay	With pay	Without pay			
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:							
St. Paul	15 days	1 year	15 days	1 year	——	For firemen and patrolmen only	——
Dayton	2 weeks	None	21 days	90 days	——	Yes	3 days
Paterson	2 weeks	——	No standard	——	Not available	No standard	
City Governments—population under 100,000:							
Tacoma	10 days	60 days	5 days	60 days	553.5	No	——
San Diego	15 days	Indef.	None	Indef.	3156	No	——
San Jose	14 days	——[1]	——	——[1]	——	Yes	Immediately
Ithaca	2 weeks[2]	Indef.	Indef.	——	——	No rule	
Ogdensburg	2 weeks	None	Indef.	——	——	——	——
Little Falls	14 days	——	——	——	——	——	——
Fremont	15 days	30 days	None	——	None	Yes	5 days
Conneaut	2 weeks	None	2 days	No limit	10	No	——

[1] Discretion of Civil Service Commission.

[2] For salaried officers.

Separations

Jurisdictions	Number of resignations from the Classified service	Exempt class	Competitive class	Non-competitive class	Labor class
State Governments:					
New York	7821	152	955	4619	2095
Illinois	514	No distinction			
Massachusetts	No data	——	——	——	——
New Jersey	2872	44	673	1616	539
Wisconsin	No information for 1921 tabulated				
City Governments—population over 250,000:					
New York	4165	39	678	2866	621
Philadelphia	946	6	140	None	800
Detroit	201	——	201	——	——
Milwaukee	57	——	——	——	133
Portland	71	——	——	——	——
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:					
Dayton	68	None	66	2	None
Yonkers	——	5	72	None	——
City Governments—population under 100,000:					
Tacoma	26	——	26	——	——
Fremont	None	None	None	None	None
Conneaut	6	None	4	None	2

Separations (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Number of removals from the Classified service	Exempt class	Competitive class	Non-competitive class	Labor class
State Governments:					
New York	835	11	60	454	310
Illinois	110	No distinction			
New Jersey	626	2	23	466	135
Maryland	19	—	19	—	—
City Governments—population over 250,000:					
New York	5666	2	108	4426	1132
Philadelphia	281	—	181	None	100
Detroit[1]	101	—	101	—	—
Milwaukee	13	—	—	—	50
Seattle	76	—	76	—	—
Portland	120	—	—	—	—
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:					
Dayton	26	None	26	None	?
Yonkers	4	None	4	None	—
City Governments—population under 100,000:					
Tacoma	12	—	12	—	—
Fremont	None	None	None	None	None
Conneaut	None	None	None	None	None

[1] Unclassified service, 524 discharged.

Separations (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Number of persons separated from the service in other ways	Number of appeals (if the law provides for appeals) made against removals	Number of removals sustained upon appeal	Number of reinstatements that resulted
State Governments:				
New York	333	None	None	None
Illinois	None	8	3	None
New Jersey	98	8	7	1
Wisconsin	——	6 average	——	——
Maryland	——	8 (hearings)	8	None
County Governments:				
Los Angeles County	——	None	None	None
City Governments—population over 250,000:				
New York	514	No appeal allowed		
Detroit	——	11	9	2
Milwaukee	645	3	1	2
Seattle	——	22	17	2
Portland	——	9	6	1
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:				
St. Paul	27 (death)	3	——	——
Dayton	None	1	——	1
City Governments—population under 100,000:				
Tacoma	7	5	4	1
San Diego	——	3	3	None
Ithaca	——	None	——	——
Ogdensburg	——	None	——	——
Fremont	None	None	——	——
Conneaut	15	1	1	——

Separations (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Number of times the trial board held hearings during 1921	To what agency are appeals directed	Is appeal to the courts provided for in the law	If so, how many cases were appealed to the courts in 1921
State Governments:				
New York	No trial board	Courts	In case of soldiers and firemen only	——
Illinois	3	Civil service commission	No	——
California	——	Civil service commission	No	——
New Jersey	16	Civil service commission	Yes	2
Wisconsin	——	Civil service commission	No	——
Maryland	8	State employment commission	No	——
County Governments:				
Los Angeles County	None	Head of department	No	1
Essex County	1	Civil service commission	Yes	None
City Governments—population over 250,000:				
New York	——	Officer and courts	——	——
Philadelphia	105	Civil service commission	No	——
Detroit	11	Civil service commission	No	——
Los Angeles	——	Civil service commission, Police Board, Fire Board, etc.	No	——
Milwaukee	3	Civil service commission	No	——
Newark	None	Civil service commission	Yes	——

Separations (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Number of times the trial board held hearings during 1921	To what agency are appeals directed	Is appeal to the courts provided for in the law	If so, how many cases were appealed to the courts in 1921
Seattle	22	Civil service commission	No	——
Portland	9	Civil service commission	——	1
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:				
Dayton	1	Civil service commission	No	——
Paterson	None	Civil service commission	Yes	None
City Governments—population under 100,000:				
Tacoma	3	Joint advisory board	No	——
San Diego	3	Civil service commission	No	——
Fremont	None	Court (common pleas)	Yes	——
Conneaut	1	Civil service commission	Yes	None

Annual Appropriations of Commissions

Jurisdictions	Total annual budget of state, city or county in 1921		Annual payroll of state, city or county in 1921		Annual appropriation of civil service commission in 1921	
	Amount	Per cent	Amount	Per cent	Amount	Per cent
State Governments:						
New York	—	—	—	—	$101,090	—
Illinois	$85,243,055	100	—	—	46,400	.05
Massachusetts	—	—	—	—	110,300	—
California	18,526,562	100	$11,838,008	63.9	39,295	.21
New Jersey	62,641,402	100	29,493,151	47.1	94,980	.15
Wisconsin	22,500,000	100	6,125,000	27.2	22,000	.10
Maryland	16,416,495	100	1,917,369	11.7	20,000	.12
County Governments:						
Los Angeles County	—	—	—	—	33,007	—
City Governments—population over 250,000:						
New York	—	—	109,075,088	—	255,248	—
Philadelphia	60,100,000	100	30,000,000	49.9	65,000	.11
Detroit	69,628,223	100	16,502,364	23.7	36,870	.05
Los Angeles	13,297,212	100	—	—	24,270	.18
Buffalo	23,915,751	100	9,079,972	38	19,365	.08
Milwaukee	21,725,994	100	12,108,179	55.7	20,801	.10
Seattle	19,409,131	100	9,800,000	50.5	27,320	.14
Portland	6,223,501	100	2,802,484	45	6,330	.10
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:						
Dayton	2,058,032	100	1,303,940	63.4	5,491	.27
Paterson	2,475,420	100	1,107,528	44.7	—	—
City Governments—population under 100,000:						
Tacoma	5,326,169	100	1,555,465	29.2	2,520	.05
San Diego	3,240,714	100	1,505,156	46.4	5,440	.17
San Jose	440,099	100	307,408	69.8	—	—
Ogdensburg	257,558	100	171,539	66.6	250	.10
Fremont	—	—	—	—	333	—
Conneaut	—	—	—	—	225	—

Miscellaneous Activities

Jurisdictions	Number of regular meetings held by the commission in 1921	Number of special meetings held in 1921	Do any of the commissioners perform services in connection with the activities of the commission other than the attendance of meetings	Approximate number of hours per week on the average required of the commission in the ordinary routine of its work
State Governments:				
New York	——	45	Yes	Every day
Illinois	11	3	Yes	President 25 hours. Commissioners attend meetings
Massachusetts	1 per week	——	Chairman daily	4 hours
California	44	——	1 full time	1 day per month
New Jersey	34	None	Yes	½ time
Wisconsin	42	——	Yes (sometimes)	3 hours
Maryland	Once or twice per week	——	Hearings, etc.	——
County Governments:				
Los Angeles County	52	7	No	3 hours
City Governments—population over 250,000:				
New York	——	——	Yes	7 hours per day
Philadelphia	250	——	Yes (secretary only)	1 full time, rest 2 hours
Detroit	52	36	——	——
Los Angeles	43	1	Yes	1½ hours
Buffalo	Daily 3 p. m.	——	Yes	5-15 hours
Milwaukee	50	None	Yes	3 hours
Seattle	52	——	No	——
Portland	2 days per month	5	Yes (whenever necessary)	6 per month
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:				
Dayton	12	9	Yes (hearings)	4 hours
Yonkers	53	3	Yes	——

Miscellaneous Activities (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Number of regular meetings held by the commission in 1921	Number of special meetings held in 1921	Do any of the commissioners perform services in connection with the activities of the commission other than the attendance of meetings	Approximate number of hours per week on the average required of the commission in the ordinary routine of its work
City Governments—population under 100,000:				
Tacoma	52	None	President	2 hours
San Diego	45	None	Oral interviews	2 or 3 hours
San Jose	22	All meetings are called	Yes—grade papers and investigate reports	1 hour
Ithaca	——	——	No	——
Ogdensburg	——	——	Yes	1 hour
Fremont	24	7	Yes (all 3 members)	2 or 3 hours every 2 weeks
Conneaut	24	6	Yes	3

Miscellaneous Activities (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Is active recruiting carried on by the commission	In what ways	Amount of expenditures for advertising in 1921
State Governments:			
New York	Yes	Circulars, posters, advertising	None paid for
Illinois	No	——	$2,213.37
Massachusetts	Yes	By mailing list	——
California	Yes	Advertising, news items, etc.	——
New Jersey	Yes	——	1,500.00
Wisconsin	No	——	325.00
Maryland	Yes	Newspapers and posters	1,758.64
County Governments:			
Los Angeles County	General and special	Advertising, correspondence, coöperation with heads of departments	75.00
Essex County	Yes	Advertising, etc.	375.00
City Governments—population over 250,000:			
New York	Yes	Advertising	Yes (by city record)
Philadelphia	Yes	Advertising	$1,500.00
Detroit	——	——	546.00
Los Angeles	——	——	403.00
Buffalo	Yes	Schools, papers, and advertising	——
Milwaukee	——	——	171.54
Newark	Yes	Advertising	500.00
Seattle	No	——	500.00
Portland	Yes	Advertising	50.00
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:			
St. Paul	——	——	34.40
Dayton	No	——	15.00
Paterson	Yes	Advertising	250.00
City Governments—population under 100,000:			
Tacoma	No	——	8.70
San Diego	No	——	——
San Jose	Very little	Advertisements in newspapers	8.40
Ogdensburg	No	——	10.00
Little Falls	——	——	20.00
Fremont	No	——	6.50
Conneaut	Yes	Soliciting	556.98

Jurisdictions	Has an equitable salary scale been set up on the basis of classification of positions	If so, is the classification kept current by the civil service commission	If not, by what agency	Is the civil service commission responsible for recommending changes in the salary scale	Does the civil service commission coöperate with the various departments and bureaus in connection with—		
					Setting examination standards	Devising and maintaining efficiency ratings	Other personnel matters (please specify)
State Governments:							
New York	No	—	—	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Illinois	No	Yes	—	Slightly	Yes	No	No
California	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	Constant consultation	None	Salaries subject to consultation
New Jersey	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	Yes (departments specify desires)	Ratings kept current	Cordial relations
Wisconsin	No	Yes	—	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Maryland	Recommended	—	—	Not at present	Yes (job analysis)	—	—
County Governments:							
Los Angeles County	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	We coöperate	Close coöperation in development of system	
Essex County	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	As a rule full coöperation, the commission reserving the right to accept or reject any recommendation of the department		
City Governments—population over 250,000:							
New York	—	—	—	No—(Board of Estimate and Apportionment)	Conference with appointing officers		
Philadelphia	No	No	—	No	Yes	None	—
Detroit	No	No authority	None	No authority	—	No	—
Los Angeles	Yes	No	City Council	No	Yes	No authority	—
Buffalo	—	—	—	—	Conferences	—	—
Milwaukee	Yes	Yes	—	No	Consults	—	Very close
Newark	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	As a rule		
Seattle	Fairly equitable	Yes	—	No	Consultation with department heads	Advice, etc.	—
Portland	No	—	—	No	Yes	—	—

Miscellaneous Activities (Continued)

Jurisdictions	Has an equitable salary scale been set up on the basis of classification of positions	If so, is the classification kept current by the civil service commission	If not, by what agency	Is the civil service commission responsible for recommending changes in the salary scale	Does the civil service commission coöperate with the various departments and bureaus in connection with—		
					Setting examination standards	Devising and maintaining efficiency ratings	Other personnel matters (please specify)
City Governments—population 100,000 to 250,000:							
St. Paul	In 6 departments	Yes	—	No	Departments furnish detailed specifications of positions to be filled		
Dayton	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	Information regarding duties	Very little	—
Paterson	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	As a rule		
City Governments—population under 100,000:							
Tacoma	Yes, some years ago	No	—	No	Yes	—	Little
San Diego	No	Yes	—	No	Consultation with heads		
San Jose	Yes	Yes	—	No	Consults with department heads		
Ithaca	No	—	—	No	—	—	—
Ogdensburg	No	—	—	No	Commission determines relative weights	—	—
Fremont	No	—	—	No	—	—	—
Conneaut	Yes	Yes	—	Yes	Relative to work in question	By standardizing	—

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